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SCHOOLBOOKS AND SHACKLES: THE 
UNDUE HARDSHIP STANDARD AND 
TREATMENT OF STUDENT DEBT  
AT BANKRUPTCY 
Abstract: Individual debtors who file for Chapter 7 bankruptcy can discharge 
most of their pre-petition debts and emerge from bankruptcy with a financial 
“fresh start.” Student loan debt is one of the few exceptions to this general policy. 
Congress created the student loan discharge exception, 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8), to 
prevent student debtors from abusing the bankruptcy system. Specifically, Con-
gress sought to prevent students who graduated from higher education programs 
from discharging their debts at bankruptcy, and then beginning lucrative careers. 
Congress, however, included an important carve-out to this exception for debtors 
whose loans impose an “undue hardship.” The undue hardship standard has cre-
ated myriad problems for bankruptcy judges because Congress left the term un-
defined in the Bankruptcy Code. Thus, courts developed a variety of tests for un-
due hardship, most notably the Johnson, Bryant, Brunner, and Totality tests. The 
Brunner test, which the majority of bankruptcy courts apply, imposes an ex-
tremely demanding burden on debtors to show undue hardship. Today, with stu-
dent debt and tuition costs reaching unprecedented levels, Congress should re-
consider the Bankruptcy Code’s treatment of student debt. This Note argues that 
Congress should amend the Bankruptcy Code to define undue hardship based on 
the Totality test used by a minority of courts. This change would promote nation-
al uniformity and would give honest student debtors an attainable opportunity for 
student loan discharge. In the context of the modern student debt crisis, this rela-
tively moderate reform would significantly help millions of student debtors. 
INTRODUCTION 
From her one-time position of economic stability, Vera Frances Thomas 
had an opportunity to make an investment, and she chose to invest in herself.1 
A healthy, fifty-seven year old woman eager to further her education, Ms. 
Thomas enrolled at Thomas Nelson Community College.2 Ms. Thomas worked 
and attended classes simultaneously, financing her education with loans from 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Appellant’s Opening Brief at *7, Thomas v. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Thomas), 931 F.3d 449 
(5th Cir. 2019) (No. 18-11091) (describing Vera Frances Thomas’s decision to enroll in community 
college at age fifty-seven). Ms. Thomas made $11.40 per hour while working a “steady” job at a call 
center in Virginia. Id. at *7–8. 
 2 Id. at *8. The highest level of education that Ms. Thomas attained before starting the community 
college program was a high school education. Id. 
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the federal government.3 Unfortunately, Ms. Thomas became overwhelmed by 
this balancing act and discontinued her education after two semesters.4 Ms. 
Thomas’s decision to leave the program marked the beginning of a physical 
and financial spiral that would leave her in an unrecognizable state of despera-
tion.5 
Shortly after deciding not to return for a third semester of college, Ms. 
Thomas’s physician diagnosed her with diabetic neuropathy, a degenerative 
disease that caused pain and numbness in her lower limbs.6 To manage her ill-
ness, Ms. Thomas took unpaid leave from her job at a call center, which even-
tually fired her from her position.7 Ms. Thomas could neither reap the benefits 
of her education nor pay off its costs, which came due after her loans entered 
repayment.8 Despite these dispiriting circumstances, Ms. Thomas took steps to 
minimize expenses and earn new income.9 She traveled across the country to 
move in with her boyfriend and obtained employment at three different jobs, 
but these attempts were all in vain.10 Ms. Thomas could not continue working, 
as diabetic neuropathy limited her to sedentary tasks and these jobs required 
her to be on her feet.11 As a last resort, Ms. Thomas filed for bankruptcy be-
cause she could not repay her student loan debt.12 
                                                                                                                           
 3 Id.  (stating that Ms. Thomas took out $7,000 in two loans from the federal government in Feb-
ruary 2012 and September 2012). 
 4 Id. (describing how Ms. Thomas attempted to balance school and work but chose not to return 
for a third semester of classes when this became too difficult). 
 5 See infra notes 6–12 and accompanying text (describing Ms. Thomas’s physical and financial 
decline). 
 6 Thomas v. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Thomas), 931 F.3d 449, 450 (5th Cir. 2019) (describing diabetic 
neuropathy’s detrimental impact on Ms. Thomas’s capacity to continue working at the call center); see 
Diabetic Neuropathy, MAYO CLINIC (Mar. 3, 2020), https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/
diabetic-neuropathy/symptoms-causes/syc-20371580 [https://perma.cc/A3ZA-V3FU] (characterizing 
diabetic neuropathy as a serious complication of diabetes that can cause painful, debilitating symp-
toms). 
 7 See In re Thomas, 931 F.3d at 450. Ms. Thomas lost her position and access to her unemploy-
ment benefits in 2016 after another company acquired her employer. Id. 
 8 See id. Ms. Thomas made two payments of $41.24 and $41.61 after her repayment period began 
in December 2013. Id. 
 9 See infra note 10 and accompanying text (describing Ms. Thomas’s attempts to save money 
while simultaneously bolstering her income). 
 10 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at *10 (listing the steps that Ms. Thomas took to 
defray costs after leaving community college). Specifically, Ms. Thomas worked at Perfumania, 
Whataburger, and the United Parcel Service after moving to Texas with her boyfriend. Id. Her lawyer 
argued that her incomplete education limited her opportunities to these low-paying jobs. Id. 
 11 See In re Thomas, 931 F.3d at 450 (stating that the reason Ms. Thomas could not hold any of these 
positions was the active nature of the work requirements). A 2017 U.S. Food and Drug Administration 
report on diabetic neuropathy featured testimonials of patients with diabetic neuropathy. See generally 
CTR. FOR FED. DRUG EVALUATION & RSCH. & U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., THE VOICE OF THE PA-
TIENT (2017), https://www.fda.gov/files/about%20fda/published/The-Voice-of-the-Patient—Neuropathic-
Pain-Associated-with-Peripheral-Neuropathy.pdf [https://perma.cc/MP33-49BY] (providing anecdotal 
accounts from patients living with diabetic neuropathy). One patient stated that “If I were to stand for 
. . . [ten] minutes [or] walk a half to three-quarters of a mile, I would start getting deep muscular 
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In the bankruptcy proceedings and appeal that followed, both courts held 
that Ms. Thomas was not entitled to a discharge of her student loan debts, 
meaning she would still be liable for her debts even after the bankruptcy pro-
ceedings concluded.13 The appropriate legal test for whether Ms. Thomas could 
discharge her student loans considered whether her circumstances imposed an 
“undue hardship” on her.14 Her debilitating illness, her thrice unsuccessful at-
tempts at obtaining employment, and her move across the country to save 
money did not avail her.15 
Ms. Thomas’s plight has broader implications than just bankruptcy law; it 
raises questions about the value of education and the U.S. government’s role in 
sponsoring it.16 Education is a deeply rooted ideal in the United States both 
legally and culturally.17 Indeed, the Supreme Court interpreted the right to re-
ceive an equal education as deriving from the U.S. Constitution itself.18 Educa-
tion is also inextricably tied to the American dream because many view it as a 
ladder to financial and social prosperity.19 None other than Benjamin Franklin 
endorsed this view when he observed that “an investment in knowledge pays 
the best interest.”20 Ms. Thomas and thousands of other similarly-situated 
                                                                                                                           
pain.” Id. at 6. Another stated that pain “usually happens when I am overtired [or if] I’ve been stand-
ing or walking for more than a few minutes.” Id. 
 12 In re Thomas, 931 F.3d at 450. Specifically, Ms. Thomas filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in 
Dallas and sought for her student loans to be discharged, meaning that she would no longer have to 
pay these debts. Id.; see infra note 31 and accompanying text (describing how some debtors receive a 
“fresh start” at bankruptcy with a discharge). For a detailed discussion and definition of Chapter 7 
bankruptcy, see infra notes 25–64 and accompanying text. 
 13 In re Thomas, 931 F.3d at 452–53 (affirming the bankruptcy court’s decision to deny Ms. 
Thomas a discharge of her student loan debt); Thomas v. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Thomas), 581 B.R. 
481, 486 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2017) (holding that Ms. Thomas was not entitled to a discharge of her 
student loan debt because she could not demonstrate an undue hardship), aff’d, 931 F.3d 449. 
 14 See In re Thomas, 931 F.3d at 452 (stating that the proper test for student loan discharge is 
whether a debtor can demonstrate an undue hardship). 
 15 See id. at 450, 452–53 (describing the measures that Ms. Thomas took to improve her financial 
situation but declining to discharge her student loan debt). 
 16 See supra notes 11–12, 15 and accompanying text (describing Ms. Thomas’s struggle to pay 
off her student loan debt). 
 17 See infra notes 18–20 and accompanying text. 
 18 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No state . . . shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.”); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (interpreting the 
Fourteenth Amendment to protect the educational rights of all American children). 
 19 See Barack Obama, The American Dream (Nov. 7, 2007), https://www.cnn.com/2007/
POLITICS/12/21/obama.trans.americandream/# [https://perma.cc/HZ4J-MZCG] (identifying afforda-
ble higher education as a means to “reclaim the American dream”); Martin Luther King, Jr., Guide-
lines for a Constructive Church (June 5, 1966), https://kinginstitute.stanford.edu/king-papers/public-
ations/knock-midnight-inspiration-great-sermons-reverend-martin-luther-king-jr-5 [https://perma.cc/
PW9V-N7H2] (lamenting in a speech on the American dream the inadequate, segregated schools for 
African-American students, and arguing that this holds the United States back from becoming a great 
nation). 
 20 John Ames & Chip Bowles, The American Bankruptcy Institute’s Investment in Knowledge: 
The Chapter 11 Professional Fee Study, NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER, Feb. 2008, at 2, 2 (citing Ben-
1624 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:1621 
debtors might take issue with that statement, however, having invested in their 
education, failed to thrive, and discovered that bankruptcy did not provide a 
backstop for their suffering.21 
Part I of this Note reviews the history of student debt in bankruptcy pro-
ceedings and describes the most prominent undue hardship tests that bankrupt-
cy courts apply.22 Part II of this Note analyzes the merits and drawbacks of 
these undue hardship tests and concludes that the Totality test is the best ap-
proach.23 Lastly, Part III of this Note discusses the role of government in stu-
dent lending and proposes reforms to the student lending regime in light of the 
modern student debt crisis.24 
I. DISCHARGING STUDENT DEBT IN BANKRUPTCY 
The United States is facing a student debt crisis, with millions of Ameri-
cans owing a collective $1.5 trillion in student debt in 2019.25 Since outstrip-
ping the collective total of credit card debt in March 2012, student debt has 
continued its alarming trajectory, coinciding with increasing rates of student 
borrowing and growing tuition costs.26 These turbulent conditions force stu-
                                                                                                                           
jamin Franklin’s axiom to complement the American Bankruptcy Institute’s funding of a study on 
Chapter 11 professional fees); Patti Van Slyke, Bruce Hopkins’ Excellent Adventure, J. KAN. BAR 
ASS’N, May 2017, at 21, 22 (quoting Benjamin Franklin to emphasize the accomplishments of a prac-
ticing attorney and author). 
 21 See Thomas v. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Thomas), 931 F.3d 449, 452–53 (5th Cir. 2019) (refusing 
to discharge Ms. Thomas’s student loan debt); Jessica L. Gregory, The Student Debt Crisis: A Synthe-
sized Solution for the Next Potential Bubble, 18 N.C. BANKING INST. 481, 485 (2014) (stating that 
there are thousands of students who filed for discharge of student loans at bankruptcy). In addition to 
the procedural and financial burdens of a bankruptcy filing, debtors often feel stigmatized by relying 
on this last resort option. See Yvana L.B.H. Mols, Bankruptcy Stigma and Vulnerability: Questioning 
Autonomy and Structuring Resilience, 29 EMORY BANKR. DEVS. J. 289, 290–91 (2012) (describing 
the societal shaming that impacts debtors and how this affects their future fiscal responsibility). 
 22 See infra notes 25–169 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 170–237 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 238–288 and accompanying text. 
 25 Gregory, supra note 21, at 481–82 (comparing the student debt crisis with the subprime mort-
gage crisis). See generally CTR. FOR MICROECONOMIC DATA, QUARTERLY REPORT ON HOUSEHOLD 
DEBT AND CREDIT 2019: Q3 (2019), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/interactives/house
holdcredit/data/pdf/HHDC_2019Q3 [https://perma.cc/4BMG-8RHL] (analyzing data from Equifax to 
identify trends in American debt as of November 2019). 
 26 ZACHARY BLEEMER ET AL., ECHOES OF RISING TUITION IN STUDENTS’ BORROWING, EDUCA-
TIONAL ATTAINMENT, AND HOME OWNERSHIP IN POST-RECESSION AMERICA 1 (2017), https://www.
newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr820.pdf?la=en [https://perma.cc/W6B2-
25QG] (stating that the prevalence of student borrowing by age twenty-five rose from 25% in 2004 to 
45% in 2016); Gregory, supra note 21, at 483 (contending that higher tuition costs are partially re-
sponsible for the increase in student debt). Moreover, college tuition has grown four times faster than 
the consumer price index since 1978 and three times faster than the rate of inflation since 1983. Daniel 
A. Austin, The Indentured Generation: Bankruptcy and Student Loan Debt, 53 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 
329, 334 (2013); Gregory, supra note 21, at 483. 
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dent debtors to seek shelter under the roofs of their parents’ houses and, in 
many cases, under the protection of the U.S. bankruptcy courts.27 
In general, bankruptcy offers debtors an avenue for discharging debt to 
improve their financial situation, or at least to stop the proverbial bleeding.28 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the focus of this Note, relieves debtors from paying 
most of their pre-bankruptcy debts, which debtors can finance by selling their 
non-exempted assets.29 Chapter 7 bankruptcy, from a policy perspective, aims 
to provide debtors with a financial “fresh start.”30 That said, the fresh start 
principle is not absolute: the Bankruptcy Code restricts which types of debtors 
can petition for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and which types of debts are dischargea-
ble.31 With regard to student debt, bankruptcy courts will only discharge this 
                                                                                                                           
 27 BLEEMER ET AL., supra note 26, at 1 (concluding that the percentage of twenty-three to twenty-
five-year-olds living with their parents or elders increased from 33.5% in 2004 to 44.9% in 2015). A 
report on the relationship between student borrowing and rising tuition, prepared for the New York 
Federal Reserve, postulated that the burden of student loan debt limits student debtors’ access to 
mortgages and home ownership. Id. at 1–2. 
 28 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (listing instances where a debtor’s debt is not dischargeable at bankruptcy); 
Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (stating that a central tenet of the Bankruptcy Code 
is to provide debtors with the opportunity to emerge from bankruptcy with fewer financial obliga-
tions). The Supreme Court, in a subsequent opinion to its 1934 case Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, elaborat-
ed that bankruptcy is intended to benefit the unfortunate debtor, not the unscrupulous one. See Grogan 
v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286–87 (1991) (describing the intended beneficiary of bankruptcy to be the 
“honest but unfortunate debtor” (quoting Local Loan Co., 292 U.S. at 244)); see also 11 U.S.C. 
§ 548(a)(1) (vesting the bankruptcy trustee with power to avoid fraudulent transfers); Tyner v. Nichol-
son (In re Nicholson), 435 B.R. 622, 630 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2010) (allowing courts to consider a debt-
or’s bad faith actions when determining if a debtor may claim property as exempt at bankruptcy). 
 29 ROBERT E. GINSBERG ET AL., GINSBERG & MARTIN ON BANKRUPTCY § 12.01 (5th ed. Supp. 
IV 2020) (discussing the basic mechanisms of Chapter 7 bankruptcy). Chapter 7 is also known as 
“ordinary” bankruptcy and is a liquidation procedure, unlike Chapter 11, which deals with the reor-
ganization of businesses, and Chapter 13, which allows debtors to retain some of their property and 
use income to pay off pre-filing debts. Id. §§ 12.01, 13.01, 15.01. 
 30 Garner, 498 U.S. at 287 (recognizing the fresh start principle as central to the Bankruptcy 
Code); Coutts v. Mass. Higher Educ. Corp. (In re Coutts), 263 B.R. 394, 399 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2001) 
(“[B]arring abuse of the bankruptcy courts and the Code, all debtors deserve at least a chance at a 
fresh start.”). Generally, Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code describes how individuals and businesses’ 
assets are liquidated and distributed to creditors to satisfy outstanding debts. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(41) 
(defining “person” to include individuals, corporations, and partnerships); id. § 109 (stating that “per-
sons” who are “debtors” may file for Chapter 7 relief and listing exceptions); id. §§ 725–726 (describ-
ing the process for selling a debtor’s assets and distributing the proceeds to satisfy creditors’ claims). 
The concept of the fresh start has animated bankruptcy law for decades, and dates back to a 1904 
Supreme Court decision, Wetmore v. Markoe. See 196 U.S. 68, 77 (1904) (“Systems of bankruptcy are 
designed to relieve the honest debtor from the weight of indebtedness which has become oppressive, 
and to permit him to have a fresh start . . . .”). The fresh start principle is bolstered by provisions that 
exempt the sale of certain types of personal property to satisfy creditors’ claims, thus allowing the 
debtor to emerge from bankruptcy with some, if limited, assets. Richard E. Mendales, Rethinking 
Exemptions in Bankruptcy, 40 B.C. L. REV. 851, 853 (1999) (contending that without exemption laws, 
bankruptcy would merely be a reprieve for individual debtors, not a fresh start). 
 31 See 11 U.S.C. § 109(a) (requiring that debtors seeking bankruptcy relief have domicile in the 
United States); id. § 109(b) (excluding railroads, domestic insurance companies, and banks from 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy relief); id. § 523(a) (listing debts that cannot be discharged by individual debt-
1626 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:1621 
obligation when a debtor can demonstrate that the debt imposes an undue 
hardship.32 This exacting standard reflects Congress’s goal of protecting the 
integrity of the student loan system from abuses by opportunistic student debt-
ors.33 
Consequently, the fresh start principle and the bankruptcy courts’ obliga-
tion to protect the student loan system conflict.34 The meaning of undue hard-
ship is the battleground for these clashing policy goals because Congress did 
not define the term in the Bankruptcy Code.35 In the context of the student debt 
crisis, there are profound implications for student debtors based on how courts 
define and operationalize undue hardship.36 
Section A of this Part provides an overview of the Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
system with a focus on discharging debt.37 Section B reviews the legislative 
                                                                                                                           
ors). A “discharge” occurs when a debtor’s legal duty to pay a debt or obligation is extinguished. 
Discharge, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). The concept of a discharge is central to the 
fresh start notion of bankruptcy, described by Judge Melvin S. Hoffman as “the bulls-eye of bankrupt-
cy.” Nickless v. Fontaine (In re Fontaine), 467 B.R. 267, 270 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2012). 
 32 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (stating that, absent an undue hardship, student debt is non-dischargeable 
in bankruptcy); Thomas v. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Thomas), 931 F.3d 449, 450–51 (5th Cir. 2019) (“To 
discharge student loan debt under the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor must show that the debt would im-
pose an ‘undue hardship’ on the debtor if it is not discharged.” (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8))). 
 33 Hicks v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Hicks), 331 B.R. 18, 22 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005) 
(stating that the purpose of the undue hardship standard was to avoid abuses of the bankruptcy system 
by student debtors). It is exceedingly difficult for debtors to demonstrate an undue hardship; only 
twenty-nine of 72,000 student loan debtors who went through bankruptcy proceedings successfully 
discharged their debt in 2008. Gregory, supra note 21, at 485. 
 34 See In re Hicks, 331 B.R. at 24 (noting that the Totality test for undue hardship seeks to bal-
ance the dual concerns of a debtor’s fresh start and protecting the student loan system from abuse); 
supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text (describing the tension between the fresh start principle and 
the Bankruptcy Code’s limitations on the types of debtors that can file for bankruptcy). Arguably, a 
“fresh start” is an overly optimistic term for the position most individual debtors find themselves in 
after a Chapter 7 proceeding. See Arthur W. Rummler, Life After Bankruptcy: Post Bankruptcy Pro-
tection from Employment Discrimination, DUPAGE CNTY. BAR ASS’N BRIEF, Jan. 2012, at 26, 29. For 
example, debtors fear retaliation from current employers or discrimination by future employers be-
cause of their decision to file, despite some state protections against these practices. Id. 
 35 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (including the undue hardship standard but leaving it undefined); 
Long v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Long), 322 F.3d 549, 554 (8th Cir. 2003) (noting that Con-
gress’s silence on the meaning of undue hardship has created a large body of conflicting case law 
attempting to define the term); Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Faish (In re Faish), 72 F.3d 
298, 302 (3d Cir. 1995) (same). In attempting to apply the undue hardship standard, courts have de-
veloped a range of tests, including the so-called Bryant test, Johnson test, Brunner test, and Totality 
test. See In re Faish, 72 F.3d at 303–04 (comparing the merits of the Bryant, Brunner, and Johnson 
tests); Kopf v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Kopf), 245 B.R. 731, 736–37, 741 (Bankr. D. Me. 2000) 
(adopting the Totality test and rejecting the Johnson and Brunner tests). The Bankruptcy Code, locat-
ed in Chapter 11 of the U.S. Code, states the bankruptcy rules that apply in cases across all ninety 
U.S. bankruptcy districts. Process—Bankruptcy Basics, U.S. COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/
services-forms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/process-bankruptcy-basics [https://perma.cc/6XJE-
TKJ3]. 
 36 See supra notes 25–27 and accompanying text. 
 37 See infra notes 40–64 and accompanying text. 
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and case law history of student debt discharges.38 Section C focuses on four 
undue hardship tests used by bankruptcy courts to determine if a debtor can 
discharge student debt.39 
A. Bankruptcy: Basic Structure and Debt Discharges 
Bankruptcy law is nearly as old as the United States itself, with the U.S. 
Constitution empowering Congress to pass bankruptcy laws as part of its Arti-
cle I powers.40 Consumer debtors seldom utilized bankruptcy law, codified in 
Title 11 of the United States Code, until the enactment of the Bankruptcy Re-
form Act of 1978, which established Chapters 7 and 13 of the Bankruptcy 
Code.41 Both individual and business debtors can access chapter 7 bankruptcy, 
which focuses on liquidation.42 The majority of consumers who file for bank-
ruptcy do so under Chapter 7 because it affords them the opportunity of a fi-
nancial fresh start.43 
The debtor or the debtor’s creditors initiate the Chapter 7 bankruptcy case 
by filing a petition with the bankruptcy court.44 Upon filing, two important 
events occur: the bankruptcy estate is created and the automatic stay is trig-
                                                                                                                           
 38 See infra notes 65–82 and accompanying text. 
 39 See infra notes 83–169 and accompanying text. 
 40 U.S. CONST. art I., § 8, cl. 4 (“The Congress shall have power . . . [t]o establish . . . uniform 
Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States[. . . .]”); see Brett Weiss, “Not 
Dead Yet:” Bankruptcy After BAPCPA, MD. BAR J., May 2007, at 17, 18 (describing the historical 
origins of the U.S. bankruptcy system).  
 41 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended at 11 
U.S.C. §§ 101–1532); Weiss, supra note 40, at 18 (assessing the impact of the Bankruptcy Reform 
Act on consumer debtors). In Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the bankruptcy trustee liquidates the consumer 
debtors’ assets to satisfy creditors’ claims, whereas in Chapter 13 bankruptcy, debtors may pay their 
creditors with regular sources of income. Weiss, supra note 40, at 18. 
 42 11 U.S.C. § 109(b) (limiting which debtors can seek Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection). This 
code provision clarifies when a “person” may be a “debtor” for the purposes of Chapter 7. Id. The 
Bankruptcy Code defines “debtor” to mean “a person or municipality concerning which a case under 
this title has been commenced.” Id. § 101(13); see id. § 109(a) (limiting who can access Chapter 7 
bankruptcy proceedings). Additionally, the code defines “person” to include individuals, partnerships, 
and corporations. 11 U.S.C. § 101(41); see id. § 109(a). Thus, reading these definitions together, a 
business may be a debtor and person able to seek Chapter 7 protection. See id. §§ 101(13), (41), 
109(b). 
 43 See David M. Madden, Dissecting Chapter 7 Bankruptcy for Businesses, DUPAGE CNTY. BAR 
ASS’N BRIEF, May 2010, at 34, 34 (stating that most consumer bankruptcy cases arise under Chapter 
7); supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing the bankruptcy fresh start principle). Most con-
sumer bankruptcy cases are resolved within six months of filing without a court proceeding. Pamela 
Foohey, A New Deal for Debtors: Providing Procedural Justice in Consumer Bankruptcy, 60 B.C. L. 
REV. 2297, 2305–06 (2019) (describing the consumer bankruptcy system’s mechanics). 
 44 11 U.S.C. §§ 301–303. This general rule applies to voluntary cases (when the debtor chooses to 
file a petition), involuntary cases (when creditors file a petition), and joint cases (spouses jointly file a 
petition). See id. 
1628 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:1621 
gered, preventing nearly all creditor activity.45 For the debtor, the importance 
of these two events can hardly be overstated.46 When the bankruptcy estate 
arises, with limited exceptions, all of the debtor’s property interests become 
property of the estate, which the Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee controls.47 The 
trustee, responsible for the administration of the estate, has the power to sell 
the property of the estate and distribute the proceeds to satisfy claims from the 
debtor’s creditors.48 
Additionally, filing the bankruptcy petition triggers an automatic stay, an 
injunction that precludes almost all post-petition creditor activity.49 This pow-
erful tool protects the estate from creditors depleting it and shields the debtor 
from creditors that exert pressure for debt repayment.50 Bankruptcy courts ab-
hor violations of the automatic stay and have the authority to impose compen-
satory and punitive damages against creditors who continue collection activi-
ties after a debtor has filed a petition.51 Examples of prohibited creditor actions 
                                                                                                                           
 45 Id. § 362 (describing the automatic stay, which prevents nearly all creditor activity once the 
petition has been filed); id. § 541(a) (stating that the filing of a bankruptcy petition creates an interest 
in nearly all of the debtor’s property, which is held in the bankruptcy estate). 
 46 See infra notes 47–48 and accompanying text. 
 47 11 U.S.C. §§ 541(a)–(b), 542(a)–(c) (describing which of the debtor’s assets becomes the prop-
erty of the estate, including property which the debtor did not possess when the bankruptcy case be-
gan); James W. McNeilly, Jr., Representing Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Debtors: Going for Broke, WIS. 
LAW., Nov. 2004, at 10, 62 (stating that property of the estate becomes subject to the bankruptcy trus-
tee’s control). An example of property that does not become part of the bankruptcy estate is funds 
placed in a retirement account at least one year before the individual files a bankruptcy petition. 11 
U.S.C. § 541(b)(5). 
 48 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (stating that the trustee has the power to sell property of the estate, sub-
ject to some limitations); id. § 704(a) (listing the duties of the trustee, including collecting the proper-
ty of the estate and liquidating it). The United States Trustee, part of the U.S. Department of Justice, 
creates the panel of trustees that work on Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases. 57 JOEL LEWIN & ERIC F. EI-
SENBERG, MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE: CONSTRUCTION LAW §§ 16.2, 16.8 (2019) (distinguishing 
between the United States Trustee and the Chapter 7 trustees that the United States Trustee is respon-
sible for appointing). In carrying out their role, trustees owe fiduciary obligations to the bankruptcy 
court, the bankruptcy process, and the parties they serve. Steven Rhodes, The Fiduciary and Institu-
tional Obligations of a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Trustee, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 147, 147–48 (2006). The 
trustee must avoid acting in a self-interested manner by taking any actions adverse to the bankruptcy 
estate. Id. at 156. 
 49 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (listing which creditor activities the automatic stay prohibits once a bank-
ruptcy petition is filed); Weiss, supra note 40, at 20–21 (stating that the automatic stay precludes 
creditor collection activities such as letters, calls, and filing of lawsuits). 
 50 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a); Weiss, supra note 40, at 21 (concluding that the automatic stay and 
bankruptcy petition “make bankruptcy an attractive option for debtors being harassed by creditors, 
those with claims and judgments against them, or those who simply cannot pay their bills”). 
 51 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1) (stating that creditors who violate the automatic stay are subject to actual 
damages and may also be required to pay punitive damages if their violation is willful); see Achter-
berg v. Creditors Trade Ass’n, Inc. (In re Achterberg), 573 B.R. 819, 840–41 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2017) 
(imposing punitive damages on a creditor that willfully violated the automatic stay by failing to vacate 
a court judgment against the debtor after the debtor filed for bankruptcy). Compensatory damages, 
also known as actual damages, are “[a]n amount awarded to a complainant to compensate for a proven 
injury or loss; damages that repay actual losses.” Damages, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 
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include creating liens against the debtor’s property, repossessing property of 
the estate, and appropriating the debtor’s wages to satisfy claims.52 Put simply, 
the bankruptcy estate creates a pool of the debtor’s disposable assets and the 
automatic stay protects the pool from depletion.53 
The goal of any Chapter 7 debtor is to discharge as much debt as possible 
and emerge from bankruptcy free of the financial obligations that necessitated 
filing for bankruptcy in the first place.54 Typically, debtors who acts honestly 
are entitled to a general discharge of all their pre-petition debt.55 Conversely, 
debtors who act dishonestly by engaging in fraud, destroying financial infor-
mation, or disobeying the court forfeit their opportunity for a general dis-
charge.56 In addition, Chapter 7 categorically makes certain types of debts non-
dischargeable.57 Non-dischargeable debts fall into two categories, those which 
                                                                                                                           
31. In contrast, punitive damages “are intended to punish [the defendant] and thereby deter blamewor-
thy conduct.” Id. In 2017 in Achterberg v. Creditors Trade Ass’n, Inc. (In re Achterberg), U.S. Bank-
ruptcy Court for the Eastern District of California Judge Ronald H. Sargis emphasized the seriousness 
of violating the automatic stay, describing it as a fundamental protection for debtors and “not some-
thing with which a creditor may trifle.” In re Achterberg, 573 B.R. at 835. Significantly, punitive 
damages are only available when a creditor willfully violates the stay, meaning that the creditor has 
knowledge of the automatic stay and intended the action that violated it. Id. at 831 (citing Goichman 
v. Bloom (In re Bloom), 875 F.2d 224, 227 (9th Cir. 1989)). 
 52 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3)–(4) (prohibiting creditors from taking possession of property of the es-
tate, creating a lien, and wage garnishment). The Bankruptcy Code defines a “lien” as a “charge 
against or interest in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation.” Id. 
§ 101(37). Thus, once the automatic stay is in effect, the creditor cannot create an interest in the prop-
erty of the estate. See id. § 362(a)(4). 
 53 See supra notes 47–52 and accompanying text (describing the nexus between the bankruptcy 
estate and automatic stay). 
 54 Colonial Penniman, LLC v. Williams (In re Colonial Penniman, LLC), 575 B.R. 664, 686 
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 2017) (“Intended to provide a breathing spell from the factors that drove the debtor 
to bankruptcy, the automatic stay protects a debtor from any action that would interfere with the debt-
or’s ability to effectively reorganize.”); see Curtis v. LaSalle Nat’l Bank (In re Curtis), 322 B.R. 470, 
483 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005) (describing the discharge as a “cornerstone[]” of bankruptcy law, allow-
ing the debtor to emerge from bankruptcy with new financial opportunity). 
 55 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (stating that an individual debtor will receive a discharge absent fraud or 
concealment); Hicks v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Hicks), 331 B.R. 18, 22 (Bankr. D. Mass. 
2005) (“A debtor under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code is generally entitled to a discharge of all 
debts that arose before the filing of the bankruptcy petition.”). 
 56 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(3) (barring discharge when a debtor has “concealed, destroyed, mutilated, 
falsified, or failed to keep or preserve any recorded information, including books, documents, records, 
and papers, from which the debtor’s financial condition or business transactions might be ascer-
tained”); id. § 727(a)(4) (excluding debtors engaging in fraud from receiving a discharge); id. 
§ 727(a)(6) (requiring that debtors obey lawful orders from the court to receive a discharge). 
 57 See infra notes 58–60 and accompanying text (listing the types of debts that cannot be dis-
charged at bankruptcy). In addition to Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases, student debt discharges are availa-
ble for some debtors who file for bankruptcy under Chapter 13 of the bankruptcy code, which allows 
individual debtors with regular incomes to pay off debts with a payment plan. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) 
(allowing Chapter 13 bankruptcy relief for individuals with regular income); Claxton v. Student Loan 
Mktg. Ass’n (In re Claxton), 140 B.R. 565, 568–69 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1992) (stating that a debtor 
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are automatically non-dischargeable, and those which must be raised by a cred-
itor in an adversarial proceeding.58 Notable automatic discharge exceptions 
include some tax obligations, domestic support obligations, and student 
loans.59 Alternatively, exceptions to discharge initiated by an adversary pro-
ceeding include money obtained by false pretenses, fraud by the debtor acting 
in a fiduciary capacity, and willful and malicious injury caused by the debtor.60 
Within this framework, the student loan debt discharge exception is sig-
nificant because the Bankruptcy Code gives debtors a lifeline for extreme cir-
cumstances.61 If a debtor can demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the student loan debt imposes an undue hardship, then the court may dis-
charge this debt.62 The conspicuous absence of an undue hardship definition in 
the Bankruptcy Code saddled bankruptcy courts with the arduous tasks of both 
interpreting and applying this term.63 The Bankruptcy Code’s silence on this 
definition of undue hardship precludes easy answers, necessitating a review of 
undue hardship’s legislative and case law in order to understand how courts 
apply it today.64 
                                                                                                                           
who filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy would receive a student debt discharge if the debtor could 
demonstrate an undue hardship, but holding that in this case the debtor did not meet this burden). 
 58 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (stating exceptions to an individual debtor’s discharge at bankruptcy); Mark 
S. Zuckerberg & Amanda K. Quick, Exceptions to the Bankruptcy Discharge, RES GESTAE, Oct. 
2013, at 32, 32 (distinguishing between automatic exceptions to discharge and those initiated by credi-
tors’ adversary proceeding). 
 59 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1), (5), (8) (excluding, automatically, some tax obligations, domestic sup-
port obligations, and student loans from discharge); see Zuckerberg & Quick, supra note 58, at 32 
(listing automatic exceptions to debt discharges).  
 60 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A), (4), (6); see Zuckerberg & Quick, supra note 58, at 33–34 (stating 
exceptions to debt discharges brought by adversary proceeding). A 2004 U.S. Bankruptcy Court for 
the Northern District of Ohio case, Superior Metal Products v. Martin (In re Martin), provides an 
example application of the willful and malicious injury exception. See 321 B.R. 437, 439–40 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ohio 2004). In In re Martin, the defendant-debtor cashed a $36,500 check intended for a differ-
ent party and spent all of the money. Id. at 439. The court held that the defendant-debtor acted willful-
ly by cashing the check knowing that he was not the intended recipient and acted maliciously because 
he used the proceeds for personal gain. Id. at 440–42. 
 61 See infra note 62 and accompanying text (describing the undue hardship safety valve for stu-
dent debtors in dire circumstances). 
 62 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (“[U]nless excepting such debt from discharge under this paragraph 
would impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor’s dependents . . . .”); Hicks v. Educ. 
Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Hicks), 331 B.R. 18, 36 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005) (requiring that a debtor 
prove undue hardship by a preponderance of the evidence). 
 63 See 11 U.S.C. § 101 (defining terms of art used in the Bankruptcy Code, but omitting undue 
hardship from the list). In his 2013 concurring opinion in Roth v. Educational Credit Management 
Corp. (In re Roth), Judge Jim Pappas of the U.S. Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit attributed Congress’s decision to leave undue hardship undefined as 
evidence that Congress intended bankruptcy judges to “craft a working definition.” 490 B.R. 908, 920 
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2013) (Pappas, J., concurring). 
 64 See infra notes 65–82 and accompanying text. 
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B. Discharging Student Debt in Bankruptcy: A Historical Perspective 
Before 1976, debtors enjoyed wide latitude to discharge student loan 
debt.65 In 1898, Congress enacted the Nelson Act, which dealt exclusively with 
liquidation and provided debtors the opportunity to raise affirmative defenses 
for discharging debts in bankruptcy.66 Congress overhauled the Nelson Act in 
1938 when it enacted the Chandler Act, which introduced the concept of busi-
ness reorganization.67 There remained, however, no provision dealing explicit-
ly with student loan debt.68 
This legal landscape changed dramatically when Congress enacted the 
Education Amendments of 1976.69 That law barred a debtor from discharging 
student loan debt if the debtor incurred it within five years of filing a bank-
ruptcy petition, unless the debtor could demonstrate that payment would im-
pose an undue hardship on the debtor or the debtor’s dependents.70 When Con-
gress revised the Bankruptcy Code two years later with the seminal Bankrupt-
cy Reform Act of 1978, it imported the undue hardship standard almost verba-
tim under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).71 Lacking a definition of undue hardship, 
                                                                                                                           
 65 See Thomas v. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Thomas), 931 F.3d 449, 453 (5th Cir. 2019) (stating that 
prior to 1976, abuses of the student loan system were common because it was easier to discharge 
student debt at bankruptcy). 
 66 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 554; David S. Kennedy & Erno Lindner, The Bank-
ruptcy Amendatory Act of 1938 / the Legacy of the Honorable Walter Chandler, 41 U. MEM. L. REV. 
769, 770–71 (2011) (describing the overhaul of the 1898 Nelson Act, which primarily dealt with liq-
uidation); Robert P. Wasson, Remedying Violations of the Discharge Injunction Under Bankruptcy 
Code § 524, Federal and Non-Bankruptcy Law, and State Law Comports with Congressional Intent, 
Federalism, and Supreme Court Jurisprudence for Identifying the Existence of an Implied Right of 
Action, 20 BANKR. DEVS. J. 77, 95 (2003) (describing the historical development of discharges in 
bankruptcy law). 
 67 Bankruptcy Act, Amendments of 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840; Kennedy & Lindner, supra note 
66, at 776–77 (detailing the broad changes introduced by the Chandler Act); Wasson, supra note 66, 
at 95 (stating that the 1898 amendment was the fourth federal bankruptcy statute and was later over-
hauled by the Chandler Act). 
 68 In re Thomas, 931 F.3d at 453 (stating that Congress introduced the undue hardship standard 
for student loan debt in 1976 when it amended the Higher Education Act of 1965). 
 69 See infra note 70 and accompanying text; Education Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-482, 
§ 439A, 90 Stat. 2081, 2141 (repealed 1978) (adding § 439A to revise the Higher Education Act of 
1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219). 
 70 Education Amendments of 1976 § 439A (amending the Higher Education Act of 1965 and 
requiring that the debtor demonstrate undue hardship to discharge student loans incurred within five 
years of bankruptcy filing). More specifically, the Act allowed discharge of a student loan debt “only 
if such discharge is granted after the five-year period . . . beginning on the date of commencement of 
the repayment period of such loan . . . [and] only if . . . payment from future income or other wealth 
will impose undue hardship on the debtor or his dependents.” Id.; In re Fonzo, 1 B.R. 722, 722–23 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1979) (relying on this statutory language when applying the undue hardship test to a 
student debtor). 
 71 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (“A discharge . . . of this title does not discharge an individual debtor 
from any debt . . . unless excepting such debt from discharge under this paragraph would impose an 
undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor’s dependents . . . .”); Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 
Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532) (updating the 
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courts looked to the sparse legislative history of the student loan discharge ex-
ception to infer its meaning.72 Bankruptcy courts began this inquiry by asking 
what concern motivated Congress to single out student loan debt as non-
dischargeable; by understanding the underlying policy, courts could then infer 
what type of cases should fall within the undue hardship carve-out.73 
From the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third and Sixth Circuits, a con-
sensus emerged that Congress had two goals in mind when creating the student 
loan discharge exception: to protect the student loan program from financial 
ruin and to prevent opportunistic student debtors from taking advantage of 
bankruptcy proceedings.74 Congress was concerned with student debtors un-
fairly benefiting from the fresh start policy by discharging their student debt at 
bankruptcy shortly after completing their education, and then leveraging those 
degrees to launch lucrative careers.75 Relying on these policy aims and lan-
guage from the 1973 report by the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the 
United States, courts developed a variety of tests for evaluating undue hard-
ship, resulting in a confusing and conflicting body of case law.76 
                                                                                                                           
Bankruptcy Code to include the undue hardship standard). The Higher Education Act provision pro-
hibited discharges for student debt unless “such loan first became due before five years before the date 
of the filing of the petition; or excepting such debt from discharge under this paragraph will impose an 
undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor’s dependents.” Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 § 523. 
 72 See In re Thomas, 931 F.3d at 543 (reviewing the history of undue hardship with an emphasis 
on the underlying congressional policy in enacting § 523(a)(8)); In re Pelkowski, 990 F.2d 737, 742–
44 (3d Cir. 1993) (interpreting the undue hardship standard based on debates in the United States 
House of Representatives and United States Senate). 
 73 See infra note 74 and accompanying text (describing Congress’s dual goals for the student loan 
discharge exception). 
 74 In re Pelkowski, 990 F.2d at 743 (“[T]he debate in the main focused on the twin goals of rescu-
ing the student loan program from fiscal doom and preventing abuse of the bankruptcy process by 
undeserving debtors.”); Andrews Univ. v. Merchant (In re Merchant), 958 F.2d 738, 740 (6th Cir. 
1992) (concluding that the student loan discharge exception protects the solvency of the student loan 
program). 
 75 Long v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Long), 322 F.3d 549, 554 (8th Cir. 2003) (“The poli-
cy of this provision was clear. Congress intended to prevent recent graduates who were beginning 
lucrative careers and wanted to escape their student loan obligation from doing so.”); Hicks v. Educ. 
Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Hicks), 331 B.R. 18, 22 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005) (describing the special 
treatment courts apply to student loans as a result of student debtors abusing the fresh start system). 
The Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, which drafted its influential findings 
in a 1973 report, was particularly concerned with consumer debtors engaging in financially reckless 
acts with the knowledge that they could rely on a bankruptcy discharge. Report of the Commission on 
the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, 29 BUS. LAW. 75, 94–95 (1973) [hereinafter Report on the 
Bankruptcy Laws]. This theory of consumer debtor abuse was the impetus for imposing an exception 
on student loan discharges within five years of the loans coming due. Id. at 96. 
 76 Report on the Bankruptcy Laws, supra note 75, at 94 (“The Commission heard testimony at its 
hearings and received a number of communications from officers of organizations and institutions to 
the effect that easy availability of discharge from educational loans threatens the survival of existing 
educational loan programs.”); see Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Faish (In re Faish), 72 F.3d 
298, 299–300 (3d Cir. 1995) (describing undue hardship as an area of law “in a state of considerable 
confusion, with bankruptcy courts within our Circuit applying a broad range of standards.”); Kopf v. 
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More amendments to the Bankruptcy Code were to follow, continuing 
Congress’s trend of abrogating debtors’ opportunities to discharge student loan 
obligations.77 In 1990, Congress extended the period in which a debtor must 
demonstrate undue hardship for student discharge from five to seven years.78 
Finally, in 2005, Congress eliminated the seven-year time period entirely with 
the passage of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act 
of 2005; thereafter, law required that all debtors wishing to discharge student 
loans must demonstrate undue hardship at any time between incurring the debt 
and filing bankruptcy.79 
Today, the student debt discharge exception remains largely unchanged 
from the 2005 amendments.80 This is not to say, however, that courts have set-
tled the issue of student loan debt.81 On the contrary, Congress’s decision to 
leave undue hardship undefined in each subsequent revision of the Bankruptcy 
Code generated a proliferation of judge-made tests, the most prominent of 
which will be discussed in Section C of this Part.82 
                                                                                                                           
U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Kopf), 245 B.R. 731, 736 (Bankr. D. Me. 2000) (“Without express statuto-
ry definition, ‘undue hardship’ has proved an eely notion. Courts have long struggled to articulate its 
content.”). Courts have based the widely accepted Brunner test for undue hardship on the following 
language from a report by the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws: “the debtor, because of factors 
beyond his reasonable control, may be unable to earn an income adequate both to meet the living costs 
of himself and his dependents and to make the educational debt payments.” Brunner v. N.Y. State 
Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In re Brunner), 46 B.R. 752, 754 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (quoting REPORT OF 
THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. 1, 
at 140 n.14 (1973)), aff’d, 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987). Thus, part of the Brunner test requires a show-
ing that the debtor or his dependents cannot maintain a minimal standard of living. Id. at 756. 
 77 See infra notes 78–80 and accompanying text (detailing the amendments). 
 78 Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–647, § 2522, 104 Stat. 4789, 4865–68 (increasing 
the period in which a debtor must demonstrate an undue hardship from five to seven years). The 
Crime Control Act also prevented debtors unable to fulfill their obligations from receiving a discharge 
for government service scholarships. Id.; see Thomas v. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Thomas), 931 F.3d 449, 
543 (5th Cir. 2019) (analyzing the impact of the 1990 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code). 
 79 Bankruptcy Abuse and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–8, § 220, 119 Stat. 
23, 59 (further revising the student loan discharge exception to apply to all student loan debt, regard-
less of when the debtor incurred the debt). 
 80 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(A)–(B) (providing that Title 11 does not discharge an individual 
debtor from any debt, “unless excepting such debt from discharge under this paragraph would impose 
an undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor’s dependents, for an educational benefit overpayment 
or loan made, insured, or guaranteed by a governmental unit, or made under any program funded in 
whole or in part by a governmental unit or nonprofit institution; or an obligation to repay funds re-
ceived as an educational benefit, scholarship, or stipend; or any other educational loan that is a quali-
fied education loan”). 
 81 See infra notes 83–169 and accompanying text. 
 82 See infra notes 83–169 and accompanying text. 
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C. Testing for Undue Hardship 
To understand the attitude of bankruptcy judges towards the undue hard-
ship tests, one need only look at the unflattering terms used in their opinions.83 
Judges have described undue hardship as an “eely notion” and an “empty ves-
sel susceptible to being filled with whatever policy objectives courts deem ap-
propriate.”84 The body of case law attempting to define and apply the concept 
of undue hardship creates confusion on two fronts.85 First, the tests themselves 
are difficult to parse because each contains multiple elements or steps.86 Sec-
ond, the differences between the tests are difficult to distinguish because all 
use similar language and espouse the same policy goals.87 The following Sub-
sections will describe the four most prominent tests and their position in mod-
ern undue hardship jurisprudence.88 
1. The Johnson Test 
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania crafted 
the Johnson test in 1979.89 In Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance 
Agency v. Johnson (In re Johnson), Deborah Lee Johnson incurred two loans 
from a bank totaling $1,500 to finance her tuition for community college.90 
After completing one semester, Ms. Johnson made no attempts to pay this debt 
                                                                                                                           
 83 See infra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 84 See Andresen v. Neb. Student Loan Program (In re Andresen), 232 B.R. 127, 137 (B.A.P. 8th 
Cir. 1999) (characterizing undue hardship as an “empty vessel” (quoting Robert F. Salvin, Student 
Loans, Bankruptcy, and the Fresh Start Policy: Must Debtors Be Impoverished to Discharge Educa-
tional Loans?, 71 TUL. L. REV. 139, 170 (1996))); Kopf v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Kopf), 245 B.R. 
731, 736 (Bankr. D. Me. 2000) (describing undue hardship as an “eely notion”). 
 85 See infra notes 86–87 and accompanying text. 
 86 See In re Andresen, 232 B.R. at 139 (adopting the totality of the circumstances test); In re 
Kopf, 245 B.R. at 737–38 (describing the Johnson test, which contains a mechanical checklist, a poli-
cy element, and a good faith element); Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In re Brun-
ner), 46 B.R. 752, 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (creating the three-part Brunner test), aff’d, 831 F.2d 395 (2d 
Cir. 1987). 
 87 In re Kopf, 245 B.R. at 740 (stating that the Totality test is broadly similar to elements of the 
Johnson and Brunner tests); Bryant v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Bryant), 72 B.R. 
913, 915 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (contending that all undue hardship inquiries begin with the same 
threshold question of what constitutes a minimal standard of living). 
 88 See infra notes 89–169 and accompanying text. 
 89 Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Johnson (In re Johnson), No. 77-2033, 1979 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 11428, at *59–61 (E.D. Pa. June 27, 1979) (creating a three-part undue hardship test, now 
known as the Johnson test). The Johnson test was the first of the undue hardship tests and influenced 
subsequent undue hardship tests. In re Andresen, 232 B.R. at 137–38. 
 90 In re Johnson, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11428, at *1. To finance her education, Ms. Johnson 
issued a $1,500 promissory note, which the Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency 
(PHEAA), subsequently purchased. Id. at *1–2. She only completed one semester at Northampton 
County Community College, and at the time of the trial, she was pregnant, involved in divorce pro-
ceedings, and planning to subsist on welfare. Id. at *1–2, *36. 
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when it became due, and subsequently filed for bankruptcy.91 Relying on the 
Higher Education Act of 1965, Ms. Johnson’s creditor, the Philadelphia Higher 
Education Assistance Agency (PHEAA), objected to the discharge of her stu-
dent debt because it did not impose an undue hardship.92 
The court held that the PHEAA’s objection was improper on procedural 
grounds, but proceeded to describe the undue hardship test—the enduring leg-
acy of this case.93 The test consists of three parts: (1) a mechanical checklist of 
factors, to assess if the debtor can repay the loan; (2) a good faith test, to de-
termine whether the debtor is maximizing their net income; and (3) a policy 
test, to measure whether the result would comport with Congress’s goals un-
derlying the student loan discharge exception.94 
At its core, the mechanical checklist assesses whether the debtor’s income 
during the loan repayment period allows the debtor to pay off the loan while 
still maintaining a minimal standard of living.95 The first part of this analysis 
measures the debtor’s earned income based on a litany of factors, including 
current employment status, wages earned, skills, education, and other sources 
of income.96 The second part of this analysis measures the debtor’s expenses, 
which include two categories: reasonable cost of living expenses and unavoid-
able extraordinary expenses, such as medical bills.97 Having approximated the 
                                                                                                                           
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. at *3–4; see Education Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94–482, § 439A, 90 Stat. 2081, 
2141 (repealed 1978) (amending the Higher Education Act of 1965, which Congress in turn repealed 
in November 1978). 
 93 In re Johnson, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11428, at *18–19 (holding that the PHEAA’s objection 
could not rely on the Higher Education Act of 1965 because Congress repealed the act on November 
6, 1978, prior to commencement of the case). The PHEAA was the unfortunate victim of the brief 
interlude between the repeal of the Higher Education Act in 1978 and enactment of the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act in 1979, which codified the student loan discharge exception in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). 
Id.; see Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended at 
11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532); Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219 (repealed 
1978). 
 94 In re Johnson, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11428, at *59–61 (summarizing the three prongs of the 
undue hardship test). In reviewing this complicated three-part structure of the Johnson test, Judge 
Haines of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maine succinctly commented that the Johnson 
test “test[s] too much.” Kopf v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Kopf), 245 B.R. 731, 741 (Bankr. D. Me. 
2000). 
 95 In re Johnson, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11428, at *22 (“Essentially, we must ascertain what 
sources of income are likely to be available to the debtor in the future, during the years when loan 
payments will be required, and whether this income will be sufficient to support the debtor—and his 
dependents—at a ‘minimal standard of living,’ in addition to funding repayment of the student loan.”). 
 96 Id. at *25–30 (listing the factors relevant to determining a debtor’s earned income during the 
loan repayment period). In sum, the court identified eleven factors relevant to earned income: rate of 
pay, wages or salaries earned, skills, sex, ability to obtain and retain employment, current employment 
status, employment record, education, health, access to transportation, and whether the debtor has a 
small dependent child. Id. 
 97 Id. at *31–35 (discussing which expenses are relevant to the mechanical checklist prong of the 
test). The court assessed the reasonableness of expenses based on the debtor’s family status, including 
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debtor’s net income during the period of loan repayment by subtracting rea-
sonable and extraordinary expenses from total income, the court asks whether 
the debtor can maintain a minimal standard of living while repaying the stu-
dent loan.98 
Next, the court applies the second prong of the test by assessing whether 
the debtor has acted in good faith in attempting to repay the student loan.99 In 
this inquiry, the court considers three factors: (1) the debtor’s efforts to secure 
high-paying employment, (2) the debtor’s efforts to maximize income, and (3) 
the debtor’s efforts to minimize expenses.100 The court in In re Johnson rea-
soned that the good faith prong reflects the policy that only honest debtors de-
serve a fresh start at bankruptcy and that Congress expected honest debtors to 
maximize their net income to pay off their debts.101 If the court finds that the 
debtor has met both the mechanical and good faith prongs of the test, the debt-
or has demonstrated an undue hardship and the court will discharge the student 
debt.102 
If, however, the debtor passes the mechanical test but fails the good faith 
test, the court proceeds to the third prong of the test by assessing whether 
granting the debtor a discharge of their student loan debt would contravene 
                                                                                                                           
whether the debtor had a spouse or dependent. Id. at *31. Extraordinary expenses, by comparison, 
were non-discretionary expenses such as medical bills. Id. at *32–33. 
 98 Id. at *40–41 (applying the test to Ms. Johnson’s financial situation and concluding that she 
lacked sufficient income to pay off her student loan and maintain a minimal standard of living). In 
1995 in Faish v. Pennsylvania Higher Education (In re Faish), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit framed the question raised by the mechanical test: 
Will the debtor’s future financial resources for the longest foreseeable period of time al-
lowed for repayment of the loan, be sufficient to support the debtor and his dependents 
at a subsistence or poverty standard of living, as well as to fund repayment of the stu-
dent loan? If the question is answered affirmatively, discharge of the student loan must 
be denied. 
72 F.3d 298, 303 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 99 See infra notes 100–102 and accompanying text (explaining what goes into the good faith anal-
ysis). 
 100 In re Johnson, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11428, at *44 (“[A] court should consider three ques-
tions: whether the debtor has made a bonafide effort to get a good-paying job; whether he has made a 
true effort to maximize his financial resources; and whether the debtor has been careful to minimize 
expenditures.”). 
 101 Id. (describing the policy underlying the good faith test); see In re Faish, 72 F.3d at 303 (iden-
tifying negligent or irresponsible debtors that failed the good faith test). In 1979 in Pennsylvania 
Higher Education Assistance Agency v. Johnson (In re Johnson), the U.S. District Court for the East-
ern District of Pennsylvania reasoned that limiting discharges to debtors who acted in good faith was 
common sense because the government’s lending system rests on the premise that student debtors will 
make competent, strenuous efforts to repay their debts. 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11428, at *42–43. 
 102 In re Johnson, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11428, at *52 (stating that the court need not apply the 
policy prong of the Johnson test unless the debtor passed the mechanical test but failed the good faith 
test). 
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Congress’s policy goals underlying the student loan discharge exception.103 
The In re Johnson court reasoned that Congress aimed to prevent students 
from abusing the bankruptcy system by discharging their student loans when 
their assets are minimal, then leveraging their education to obtain high-paying 
jobs.104 Like the good faith test, the In re Johnson court identified three con-
siderations relevant to the policy test: (1) the amount of the student loan debt, 
(1) the student debt as a percentage of total indebtedness, and (3) the educa-
tional benefit derived from the student loans.105 Applying this test to Ms. John-
son, the court held that she was not the type of abusive debtor that Congress 
targeted because her student loan debt was relatively small, it comprised a rela-
tively small percentage of her total debt, and she never experienced any benefit 
from her education.106 
In conclusion, the Johnson test requires a debtor to meet the mechanical 
prong and either the good faith or policy prong to successfully demonstrate an 
                                                                                                                           
 103 Id. (“Where a debtor’s situation satisfies the requirements of a mechanical undue hardship test, 
but the debtor fails the good faith test, then the court must determine whether the policy underlying 
the § 439A bar to discharge would be affected by denying discharge to this particular individual.”). 
 104 Id. at *53 (stating Congress’s policy for amending the Bankruptcy code to include the student 
loan discharge exception). The concern for students discharging debt before beginning a profitable 
career made possible by their federally financed education reverberates throughout the case law. Long 
v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Long), 322 F.3d 549, 554 (8th Cir. 2003) (“Congress intended to 
prevent recent graduates who were beginning lucrative careers and wanted to escape their student loan 
obligation from doing so.”); Hicks v. Educ. Credit. Mgmt. Corp. (In re Hicks), 331 B.R. 18, 22 
(Bankr. D. Mass. 2005) (“The Bankruptcy Code was amended to provide this special treatment for 
student loans in reaction to perceived abuses of the bankruptcy discharge—namely, that recent college 
graduates were filing for bankruptcy to rid themselves of student loan obligations ‘on the eve of a 
lucrative career.’” (quoting Andresen v. Neb. Student Loan Program, Inc. (In re Andresen), 232 B.R. 
127, 130 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 1999))). Educational Credit Management Corp. v. Mason (In re Mason), 
decided by the Ninth Circuit in 2006, exemplifies the type of behavior that Congress sought to dis-
courage, where a debtor with a bachelor’s and law degree attempted to discharge his student loans 
after failing the bar exam one time. 464 F.3d 878, 885 (9th Cir. 2006). The debtor failed to persuade 
the court that he made a good faith attempt at repaying his loans, noting that he only took the bar one 
time and has significant leisure time from working part-time. Id. 
 105 In re Johnson, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11428, at *54–56. 
 106 Id. at *57–58. The court compared Ms. Johnson’s $1,500 of student loan debt with two other 
students whose debts totaled $5,375.31 and $5,575 respectively. Id. at *54. Likewise, the court com-
pared Ms. Johnson’s percentage of indebtedness (30%) against a law student whose student loans 
comprised 78% of his total indebtedness. Id. at *55. The In re Johnson court, stating that few bank-
ruptcy courts focused on the percentage of indebtedness in their analysis, did not provide further guid-
ance about what percentage would be significant. Id. The reasoning underlying this factor is that stu-
dents aiming to abuse the bankruptcy system took out educational loans with the understanding that 
they would be discharged, and thus would not have other outstanding debts. Id. at *53–55. 
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undue hardship.107 In re Johnson’s legacy is its influence on the modern undue 
hardship tests, not its application by modern bankruptcy courts.108 
2. The Bryant Test 
Pennsylvania’s bankruptcy courts continued to innovate after deciding 
Johnson, as evidenced by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania repudiation of the Johnson test in Bryant v. Pennsylvania Higher 
Education Assistance Agency (In re Bryant) in 1987.109 The Bryant test was a 
reaction to the perceived subjectivity of the Johnson test.110 To achieve greater 
objectivity, the In re Bryant court focused on a concrete statistic, the federal 
poverty line, as the guiding factor for its novel methodology.111 This approach 
grew out of the court’s desire to avoid substituting its own judgment for that of 
the debtor’s with regards to the reasonableness of the debtor’s expenditures.112 
The In re Bryant court first identified a threshold question common to any 
undue hardship analysis: what is the “minimal standard of living” for a student 
debtor?113 The court reasoned that a debtor who lives near or below the federal 
poverty line does not have a minimal standard of living and thus, an undue 
                                                                                                                           
 107 See supra note 103 and accompanying text (describing the In re Johnson methodology for 
applying the mechanical, good faith, and policy tests). 
 108 See In re Andresen, 232 B.R. at 137–38 (characterizing the Brunner test as a variation on the 
Johnson test); Hicks v. Educ. Credit. Mgmt. Corp. (In re Hicks), 331 B.R. 18, 27 n.11 (Bankr. D. 
Mass. 2005) (commenting on the infrequent application of the Johnson test). 
 109 See Bryant v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Bryant), 72 B.R. 913, 915 (Bankr. 
E.D. Pa. 1987) (rejecting the Johnson test in favor of a new test focused on an objective measure of 
debtor hardship, the federal poverty line); In re Johnson, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11428, at *59–61 
(creating the Johnson test for undue hardship). 
 110 Compare In re Johnson, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11428, at *46–47 (scrutinizing whether the 
debtor’s decision to move out of her parents’ home maximized her financial resources), with In re 
Bryant, 72 B.R. at 915 (attempting to mitigate this type of subjective judgment by focusing its test on 
the federal poverty line). 
 111 In re Bryant, 72 B.R. at 916 (identifying the federal poverty line as the principal factor in 
determining whether a debtor is maintaining a minimal standard of living). The court chose this yard-
stick because it is updated annually and considers the debtor’s family situation. See id. 
 112 See id. at 918 (“We find ourselves in disagreement with those courts which have denied dis-
charges of student loans on the basis of whether any given expenses are justified, as these represent 
subjective value judgments concerning which we consider ourselves no better able to gauge than, 
generally, debtors themselves.”). This approach breaks with the Johnson test, which assesses the rea-
sonableness of the debtor’s expenses in both its mechanical and good faith prongs. Compare In re 
Johnson, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11428, at *59–61 (using the mechanical and good faith prongs to 
measure the effort and ability of a debtor to repay student loans), with In re Bryant, 72 B.R. at 918 
(relying on an objective, numerical approach in its undue hardship test). 
 113 In re Bryant, 72 B.R. at 916 (“A question presented at the outset is: What is the definition of ‘a 
minimal standard of living?’”). To support this methodology, the court cited a report from the Com-
mission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, which stated that an undue hardship exists 
when the debtor and his dependents cannot maintain a minimal standard of living. Id. at 915; see RE-
PORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 93-
137, pt. 1, at 140 n.14 (1973).  
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hardship is presumed.114 The court recognized, however, that merely compar-
ing the debtor’s financial situation to the poverty line does not sufficiently cap-
ture relevant extraordinary circumstances.115 
Under the second part of the test, the court must look to whether “unique” 
or “extraordinary” circumstances exist that impact the debtor’s financial bur-
den.116 The In re Bryant court considered two general types of extraordinary 
circumstances.117 First, there may be circumstances that increase the burden of 
student loans on the debtor, such as illness, medical bills, and unusual respon-
sibilities of family members.118 Second, there may be circumstances that ren-
der a student loan discharge unconscionable, such as a debtor’s refusal to max-
imize their financial position or have potential to earn a significant income in 
the near future.119 Viewing these two prongs together, the test proceeds as fol-
lows: a debtor who lives significantly above the poverty line is not entitled to 
an undue hardship discharge unless the debtor can demonstrate extraordinary 
circumstances that increase their financial burden; conversely, a debtor who 
lives near or below the federal poverty line is entitled to an undue hardship 
discharge unless there are extraordinary circumstances that render a discharge 
unconscionable.120 
To the credit of the In re Bryant court, this test is easier to comprehend 
when applied to the facts of a case rather than in abstract description.121 Twen-
ty-five-year-old Mary Gamble incurred $3,000 of student debt.122 After com-
                                                                                                                           
 114 In re Bryant, 72 B.R. at 916 (“[W]e hold that where the debtor’s gross income is at, near or 
below the federal poverty guidelines, that would fulfill the meaning of ‘minimal standard of living.’”). 
 115 Id. at 917 (recognizing that extraordinary circumstances may exist that would warrant a find-
ing of undue hardship for a debtor who is significantly above the poverty line, such as debtors who 
refuse to maximize their resources through frivolous spending). 
 116 Id. 
 117 See infra notes 118–119 and accompanying text. 
 118 See In re Bryant, 72 B.R. at 918 (listing extraordinary circumstances that would increase a 
debtor’s financial burden). 
 119 Id. at 919 (“Examples of such situations could be individuals who refuse, without good reason, 
to maximize their resources, or who have a distinct prospect of increased income in the immediate 
future, or whose circumstances are otherwise likely to undergo an imminent positive change.”). The 
U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania’s 1987 discussion in Bryant v. Penn-
sylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency (In re Bryant) of Lewis Bryant’s attempts to maximize 
his income is an example of the fiscal behavior the court sought to encourage. Id. at 925. After failing 
to pass the Pennsylvania bar exam five times, Bryant worked multiple part-time jobs in the legal field, 
obtained employment as a substitute teacher, worked as a counselor in a methadone clinic, and con-
tinued preparations to retake the bar. Id. at 923–24. Citing these activities, the court praised Bryant for 
his effort and motivation. Id. at 925. 
 120 See supra notes 113–119 and accompanying text (describing different types of extraordinary 
circumstances). 
 121 See infra notes 122–126 and accompanying text (applying the Bryant test to a concrete case). 
 122 In re Bryant, 72 B.R. at 919–20 (describing Ms. Gamble’s education and financial history 
leading up to her voluntary filing for bankruptcy in September 1985). In addition to Ms. Gamble, the 
court also reviewed the case of a debtor who was significantly above the poverty line and did not 
demonstrate an undue hardship. Id. at 921–22. 
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pleting several semesters of community college, Ms. Gamble dropped out be-
cause of financial difficulties and worked part time at a fast-food restaurant.123 
The court found that Ms. Gamble had an undue hardship because her net in-
come was approximately half of the federal poverty line.124 Ms. Gamble’s 
creditors did not demonstrate any extraordinary circumstances that would have 
made a discharge of her student debt unconscionable.125 Thus, she was entitled 
to a discharge of her student loan debt.126 
The Bryant test did not survive long in the canon of undue hardship case 
law.127 The Third Circuit repudiated the test in 1995 when it decided Pennsyl-
vania Higher Education Assistance Agency v. Faish (In re Faish), adopting a 
new test, which became known as the Brunner test.128 Criticisms that the Bry-
ant test focused too narrowly on the debtor’s financial condition at the time of 
bankruptcy and its perceived failure to account for Congress’s policy aims 
caused the Bryant test to largely fade from relevance.129 
3. The Brunner Test 
Within months of the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania creating the Bryant test, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
                                                                                                                           
 123 Id. The court also noted that she was healthy, had no dependents, no driver’s license, and 
failed to secure employment as a secretary despite multiple attempts to do so. Id. 
 124 Id. at 920 (noting that Ms. Gamble’s net income of $2,880 was below the federal poverty 
threshold of $5,500). In 2021, the federal poverty level in the United States was $12,880 for a house-
hold of one person. U.S. Federal Poverty Level Guidelines Used to Determine Financial Eligibility for 
Certain Federal Program, OFF. OF THE ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR PLANNING & EVALUATION, https://
aspe.hhs.gov/2021-poverty-guidelines [https://perma.cc/W2K9-WRCZ] (listing the federal poverty 
level for 2021 for households between one and eight members in the lower forty-eight states and the 
District of Columbia).  
 125 In re Bryant, 72 B.R. at 921 (holding that Ms. Gamble’s creditor, PHEAA, did not show any 
extraordinary circumstances that would make discharging her loan unconscionable). The court reject-
ed the PHEAA’s argument that because Ms. Gamble could obtain a driver’s license but did not do so, 
she passed up an opportunity to improve her job prospects. Id. 
 126 Id. The court’s decision not to discharge Paul Pine’s student loan debt provides a counterex-
ample for Ms. Gamble’s case. Id. at 922–23. Mr. Pine’s yearly net income was $7,332, which exceed-
ed the federal poverty line at the time of $5,500. Id. at 922. The court found that Mr. Pine’s debt was 
non-dischargeable because he failed to show any extraordinary circumstances that warranted a dis-
charge. Id. at 923. 
 127 See infra notes 128–129 and accompanying text (describing the rejection of the Bryant test in 
1995). 
 128 See Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Faish (In re Faish), 72 F.3d 298, 304 (3d Cir. 
1995) (rejecting the Bryant test in favor of the Brunner test); see also In re Bryant, 72 B.R. at 916–17. 
 129 See In re Faish, 72 F.3d at 304 (rejecting the Bryant test because it failed to account for Con-
gress’s policy aims); Sands v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc. (In re Sands), 166 B.R. 299, 306 
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1994) (rejecting the Bryant test because it discounts potential changes in the 
debtor’s future financial condition); Craig A. Gargotta, “Undue Hardship” and the Discharge of Stu-
dent Loans, 15 AM. BANKR. J. INST. 10, 42 (discussing how courts rejected the Bryant test because it 
failed to reflect congressional policy and did not hold debtors accountable for financial mismanage-
ment). 
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Circuit in 1987 created the Brunner test in Brunner v. New York State Higher 
Education Services Corp., sparking a revolution in undue hardship jurispru-
dence.130 Since its inception, the Brunner test has appealed widely to bankrupt-
cy courts and the majority of courts use it today.131 Best understood as an im-
provement upon the Johnson test, the plaintiff must satisfy all three parts of the 
Brunner test to demonstrate an undue hardship.132 
First, the debtor must show that based on current income and expenses 
the debtor cannot maintain a minimal standard of living.133 This fact-based 
analysis focuses on the debtor’s monthly net income.134 If the debtor’s reason-
able monthly expenses, including repayment of the loan, exceed the debtor’s 
income, then the debtor cannot maintain a minimal standard of living.135 
Second, the debtor must demonstrate that this substandard financial state 
of affairs will continue for a significant part of the loan repayment period be-
cause of circumstances outside of the debtor’s control.136 In this analysis, 
courts consider whether some event or condition makes it unlikely that the 
debtor’s income will increase in the future, thus decreasing the likelihood that 
the debtor will eventually be able to repay the student loans.137 Types of cir-
                                                                                                                           
 130 Brunner v. N.Y. Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir. 1987) (affirming the 
district court’s novel, three-part test for undue hardship). But see In re Bryant, 72 B.R. at 916–18 
(creating the objective Bryant test for undue hardship). 
 131 See U.S. Dep’t of Educ. v. Gerhardt (In re Gerhardt), 348 F.3d 89, 91 (5th Cir. 2003) (adopt-
ing the Brunner test in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and recognizing it as the most 
widely accepted test for undue hardship); In re Faish, 72 F.3d. at 305 (adopting the Brunner test in the 
Third Circuit); In re Roberson, 999 F.2d 1132, 1135 (7th Cir. 1993) (adopting the Brunner test in the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit). 
 132 Andresen v. Neb. Student Loan Program (In re Andresen), 232 B.R. 127, 137–38 (B.A.P. 8th 
Cir. 1999) (stating that the Johnson test strongly influenced the Brunner test). Compare Brunner, 831 
F.2d at 396 (creating a three-part test that assesses a debtor’s expenses and good faith efforts at re-
payment), with Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Johnson (In re Johnson), No. 77-2033, 1979 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11428, at *59–61 (E.D. Pa. June 27, 1979) (applying a three-prong test for undue 
hardship, one of which focused entirely on a debtor’s good faith attempts at repayment). 
 133 Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396 (stating that the minimal standard of living prong of the test is the 
easiest for debtors to meet). 
 134 Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In re Brunner), 46 B.R. 752, 754 (S.D.N.Y. 
1985) (determining whether a debtor maintains a minimal standard of living by reviewing the debtor’s 
current income and expenses, including loan repayment), aff’d, 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 135 Thomas v. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Thomas), 931 F.3d 449, 451 (5th Cir. 2019) (holding that the 
debtor cannot maintain a minimal standard of living because her reasonable monthly expenses, $640, 
exceed her monthly income of $194); Brunner, 831 F.3d at 396. 
 136 Brunner, 831 F.3d at 396 (requiring “that additional circumstances exist indicating that this 
state of affairs is likely to persist for a significant portion of the repayment period of the student 
loans”). In stark contrast to the minimal standard of living prong, courts have described this second 
prong as “exceptionally demanding” because the debtor’s circumstances must be both exceptional and 
outside of the debtor’s control. In re Thomas, 931 F.3d at 451. 
 137 See Brunner, 831 F.3d at 396 (holding that the debtor failed to meet the second prong of the 
undue hardship test because she could not show that her present financial status would persist 
throughout the loan period); In re Brunner, 46 B.R. at 757–58 (stating that the debtor failed the sec-
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cumstances that could satisfy this prong are disability, old age, dependents, and 
the total foreclosure of job prospects.138 Moreover, some Brunner jurisdictions 
require the debtor to demonstrate a “total incapacity” to repay the student loan 
debt in order to satisfy this prong of the test.139 This incredibly high standard 
limits discharges to extreme cases and sometimes bars debtors in truly calami-
tous situations from discharging student loan debt.140 
Third, the debtor must show that they made good faith efforts to repay the 
student loan debt.141 Courts measure good faith by the debtor’s competence in 
managing their financial affairs by maximizing net income and taking steps to 
either pay off or defer the student loan debt.142 Thus, courts look unfavorably 
upon debtors who have not repaid any of the debt or have used disposable in-
come on non-essential purchases during the loan repayment period.143 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s decision in United States 
Department of Education v. Gerhardt (In re Gerhardt) in 2003 provides an ar-
                                                                                                                           
ond prong of the test because she failed to present evidence that all of her job prospects in her desired 
field were closed). 
 138 Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396 (describing the types of evidence that a debtor must demonstrate to 
satisfy the second prong of the Brunner test). 
 139 In re Thomas, 931 F.3d at 451 (requiring total incapacity to repay the loan debt, both at the 
time of bankruptcy filing and in the future); U.S. Dep’t of Educ. v. Gerhardt (In re Gerhardt), 348 
F.3d 89, 92 (5th Cir. 2003) (requiring total incapacity to satisfy the Brunner test); Pa. Higher Educ. 
Assistance Agency v. Faish (In re Faish), 72 F.3d 298, 307 (3d Cir. 1995) (same). Judge Harlin D. 
Hale of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas summarized this requirement’s 
devastating impact on student debtors when he stated that, “in fifteen years on the bench, the under-
signed judge has never discharged a student loan over the objection of the lender.” Thomas v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Educ. (In re Thomas), 581 B.R. 481, 482 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2017), aff’d, 931 F.3d 449. In a 
rare example where a debtor satisfied the “total incapacity” standard, the debtor was diagnosed with 
cancer after taking out student loans, lost his house in Hurricane Ike (for which he was not insured), 
and suffered from clinical depression. Henslee v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Henslee), No. 06-
35570-H5-7, 2010 WL 1372483, at *2–3 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 1, 2010).  
 140 See In re Thomas, 931 F.3d at 450, 452–53. The Fifth Circuit’s 2019 decision in Thomas v. 
Department of Education (In re Thomas) epitomizes the impact of the total incapacity standard in 
holding that the debtor did not have an undue hardship despite having diabetic neuropathy. Id. at 450. 
This debilitating disease prevented the debtor from all non-sedentary work and forced her to quit three 
different jobs. Id. 
 141 Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396. The inclusion of a good faith requirement is a notable similarity 
between the Johnson and Brunner tests. See id.; Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Johnson (In 
re Johnson), No. 77-2033, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11428, at *44 (E.D. Pa. June 27, 1979). They are 
distinguishable because, whereas the Brunner test requires good faith, it is not mandatory under the 
Johnson test if the debtor satisfies the policy prong. See In re Johnson, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *52. 
 142 See In re Roberson, 999 F.2d 1132, 1136 (7th Cir. 1993) (concluding that a debtor who negli-
gently managed their personal finances did not act in good faith); Brunner, 831 F.2d at 397 (holding 
that the debtor did not act in good faith because she did not seek deferment of payment prior to peti-
tioning for a discharge). 
 143 See In re Roberson, 999 F.2d at 1136 (opining that using funds to send children to a private 
school during the loan repayment period demonstrates bad faith). If, however, a debtor makes no 
payments on his or her student loan debt because the debtor is financially unable to do so, then the 
lack of payments is not dispositive on the issue of good faith. Sands v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc. 
(In re Sands), 166 B.R. 299, 312 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1994). 
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chetypical, recent application of the Brunner test.144 In In re Gerhardt, the 
debtor was a cellist in the Louisiana Philharmonic who owed more than 
$77,000 in student debt.145 While working as a cellist and music teacher, Ger-
hardt earned $1,680.47 per month while paying $1,829.39 in monthly expens-
es.146 First, in its analysis, the court found that Gerhardt could not maintain a 
minimal standard of living while repaying the student loans because his 
monthly expenses were greater than his monthly income.147 Second, the court 
held that Gerhardt did not demonstrate additional circumstances that created a 
total incapacity to repay his loans for a significant period of the loan because 
he was healthy, educated, and had no dependents.148 Although the court did not 
directly address whether Gerhardt made good faith repayment efforts, it im-
plied that he did not by mentioning that he repaid only $755 of his total debt 
and chose to attend a music festival during the loan repayment period.149 
Critics of the Brunner test contend that the second prong creates unrea-
sonably harsh outcomes and that the good faith prong relies too heavily on 
analysis of past behavior, thus contravening the fresh start principle.150 Not-
withstanding these arguments, the Brunner test is unquestionably popular and 
is the current law in the majority of circuits.151 
                                                                                                                           
 144 In re Gerhardt, 348 F.3d at 90–92; see infra notes 145–149 and accompanying text (describ-
ing application of the Brunner test for a musician who failed to demonstrate an undue hardship). 
 145 In re Gerhardt, 348 F.3d at 90, 92. The debtor used $77,000 in loans to finance his musical 
education at University of Southern California, University of Rochester, and the New England Con-
servatory of Music. Id. at 90. 
 146 Id. at 92. 
 147 See id. (citing Gerhardt’s net loss of $148.92 per month as evidence that he did not have a 
minimal standard of living). 
 148 Id. The court also focused on Mr. Gerhardt’s potential for finding employment outside of his 
chosen profession, such as teaching or working in a music store. Id. Based on this, the court reasoned 
that Mr. Gerhardt did not prove a total incapacity to repay his loans because he did not broaden his 
employment search beyond his chosen field. See id. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Hicks v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Hicks), 331 B.R. 18, 28 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005) 
(stating that prong two of the Brunner test is “overkill” and contending that the good faith element is 
too retrospective); Crowley v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Crowley), 259 B.R. 361, 367–68 (Bankr. 
W.D. Mo. 2001) (arguing that the Brunner test’s good faith element lacks textual support in the legis-
lative history). 
 151 See, e.g., In re Gerhardt, 348 F.3d at 91 (adopting the Brunner test in the Fifth Circuit); Pa. 
Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Faish (In re Faish), 72 F.3d 298, 305 (3d Cir. 1995) (adopting the 
Brunner test in the Third Circuit); In re Roberson, 999 F.2d 1132, 1135 (7th Cir. 1993) (adopting the 
Brunner test in the Seventh Circuit); see also supra note 131 and accompanying text (describing the 
widespread adoption of the Brunner test). 
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4. The Totality Test 
A minority of federal circuits have adopted the Totality test, which serves 
as the modern counterpart to Brunner.152 Proponents of the Totality test con-
tend that its flexible structure gives bankruptcy courts greater discretion to ac-
count for extraordinary circumstances that affect a debtor’s ability to repay 
student loans and thus avoids the harsh results created by the Brunner test.153 
The modern formulation of the test, enumerated in Long v. Educational 
Credit Management Corp. (In re Long) in 2003 by the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit, is innovative because of its unique structure.154 The 
Long court focused on a single, overarching question: based on the debtor’s 
future financial resources, will the debtor be able to pay off the student loan 
while maintaining a minimal standard of living?155 
When answering this question, a bankruptcy court faces three subsidiary 
considerations: (1) the debtor’s past, present, and approximated future finan-
cial resources; (2) the reasonable living expenses of the debtor and the debtor’s 
dependents; and (3) other relevant facts and circumstances related to the debt-
or’s case.156 Prong three is the crux of the test because its open-endedness 
gives bankruptcy courts broad discretion to account for unique factors that af-
fect a debtor’s ability to pay.157 The Totality test may have originated in the 
                                                                                                                           
 152 See Long v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Long), 322 F.3d 549, 554 (8th Cir. 2003) (adopt-
ing the totality of the circumstances test for undue hardship); Kopf v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (In re 
Kopf), 245 B.R. 731, 741 (Bankr. D. Me. 2000) (same). But see Brunner v. N.Y. Higher Educ. Servs. 
Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir. 1987) (stating a different three-part undue hardship test, often re-
ferred to as the Brunner test). Likewise, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has adopted a 
variation of the totality approach, considering “many factors” in its undue hardship inquiry but declin-
ing to explicitly adopt any particular test. Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hornsby (In re Hornsby), 
144 F.3d 433, 437 (6th Cir. 1998). 
 153 See In re Long, 322 F.3d at 554 (“We prefer a less restrictive approach to the ‘undue hardship’ 
inquiry.”); In re Kopf, 245 B.R. at 744 (arguing that the “total incapacity” standard enumerated in 
Brunner is overly harsh). 
 154 In re Long, 322 F.3d at 554–55 (describing the modern iteration of the Totality test); infra 
notes 155–156 and accompanying text (detailing the relevant considerations under the test). The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit initially defined the contours of the Totality test in Andrews v. 
South Dakota Student Loan Assistance Corp. (In re Andrews) in 1981. See 661 F.2d 702, 704 (8th Cir. 
1981); see also Andresen v. Neb. Student Loan Program (In re Andresen), 232 B.R. 127, 139 (B.A.P. 
8th Cir. 1999) (adopting the Totality test over the Brunner, Bryant, and Johnson tests). 
 155 See In re Long, 322 F.3d at 554–55 (“Simply put, if the debtor’s reasonable future financial 
resources will sufficiently cover payment of the student loan debt—while still allowing for a minimal 
standard of living—then the debt should not be discharged.”). The emphasis on the “minimal standard 
of living” resembles the first prong of the Bryant and Brunner tests. See id.; Bryant v. Pa. Higher 
Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Bryant), 72 B.R. 913, 916 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (using the federal 
poverty guideline to determine whether a debtor has a minimal standard of living); Brunner, 831 F.2d 
at 396 (including minimal standard of living in the first prong of its undue hardship test). 
 156 See In re Long, 322 F.3d at 554. 
 157 Id.; see In re Andresen, 232 B.R. at 140. For example, in 1999 in Andresen v. Nebraska Stu-
dent Loan Program (In re Andresen), the Eighth Circuit held that a student loan debt created an undue 
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Eighth Circuit, but bankruptcy courts in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit have taken up the mantle and championed it.158 The U.S. Bankruptcy 
Court for the District of Massachusetts’ decision in 2006 in Gharavi v. United 
States Department of Education (In re Gharavi) is worth examining in detail 
for its adroit application of the Totality test.159 
In 1993, Minoo Gharavi enrolled in a four-year optometry program, 
which she financed with student loans.160 After two years in the program, how-
ever, Ms. Gharavi was diagnosed with optic neuritis and Graves’ disease, re-
sulting in symptoms that effectively precluded her from completing her educa-
tion.161 She began working as an optometric technician, but a diagnosis in 2002 
of multiple sclerosis limited her ability to work.162 She filed for bankruptcy in 
April of 2003, seeking the discharge of her $63,628.01 in student debt from 
four loans.163 
In In re Gharavi, Judge William C. Hillman emphasized the detrimental 
effects that multiple sclerosis had on Ms. Gharavi’s present and prospective 
income, and calculated that based on reasonable expenses and expected future 
income, she had a monthly net income of $62.29.164 This income was insuffi-
cient to cover even the most permissive payment schedule the lender pro-
posed––$419.50 per month.165 
The court reasoned that, based on Ms. Gharavi’s disease, limited pro-
spects for increased income, and her inability to meet the most inexpensive 
                                                                                                                           
hardship because the debtor’s disability made it unlikely that she would increase her income in the 
future and she would lose access to child support once her child reached adulthood. 232 B.R. at 141. 
 158 Gharavi v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Gharavi), 335 B.R. 492, 497 (Bankr. E.D. Mass. 2006) 
(applying the totality of the circumstances test); Kopf v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Kopf), 245 B.R. 
731, 741 (Bankr. D. Me. 2000) (adopting the totality of the circumstances test as the best approach to 
undue hardship); see In re Andresen, 232 B.R. at 139. 
 159 In re Gharavi, 335 B.R. at 497. 
 160 Id. at 494–96. Ms. Gharavi held a Bachelor of Science degree in architecture from Texas 
Southern University and sought to continue her education at the graduate level by enrolling at the New 
England College of Optometry. Id. at 494–95. 
 161 Id. at 495. When Ms. Gharavi contracted optic neuritis in 1995, she took a leave of absence 
from the program but eventually returned to continue her studies. Id. When doctors subsequently 
diagnosed her with Graves’ disease, the symptoms of which impaired her ability to concentrate and 
remember, she failed two of her final exams and left the program. Id. 
 162 Id. at 496. Ms. Gharavi’s multiple sclerosis symptoms included difficulty concentrating, 
memory loss, and fatigue, which limited her to working forty hours per week. Id. Moreover, these 
symptoms precluded her from obtaining a second job, which would have provided additional income 
to pay her student debts. Id. at 498. 
 163 Id. at 498. Whether Ms. Gharavi made any payments towards her student loans was an issue of 
factual dispute between the parties: Ms. Gharavi claimed that she made monthly payments of $88.21 
on two of these loans, but her creditors contended that they received no payments from her. Id.  
 164 See id. at 497, 500 (stating that Ms. Gharavi “will never be able to earn substantially more 
than she earns now due to her multiple sclerosis”). Judge William C. Hillman took care to describe her 
monthly expenses in detail in the opinion, assessing the reasonableness of her cigarette use, transpor-
tation expenses, and tax refunds. Id. at 498–501. 
 165 Id. at 501. 
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payment schedule, her student debt created an undue hardship that entitled her 
to a discharge.166 Additionally, the court recognized that Ms. Gharavi could pay 
some of her student debt with her $62.29 monthly surplus and exercised its 
discretion to discharge only three of the four student loans.167 To reach this 
conclusion, the court engaged in a fact-based analysis of Ms. Gharavi’s financ-
es and considered the impact that her physical ailments would have on her cur-
rent and future financial prospects, thus applying the three considerations rele-
vant to the Totality test analysis.168 The court’s decision to discharge some, but 
not all, of Ms. Gharavi’s loans represents the flexibility and close factual anal-
ysis lauded by the Totality test’s advocates.169 
II. UNDUE HARDSHIP: WHICH TEST IS BEST? 
Congress’s decision to leave the term “undue hardship” undefined in the 
Bankruptcy Code left bankruptcy judges with discretion to decide which test 
applies in each federal circuit.170 As discussed in Part I, the majority of courts 
today have adopted versions of the Brunner test, a minority of courts have en-
dorsed the Totality test, and courts have largely shelved the Johnson and Bry-
ant tests.171 Analysis of these tests must delve deeper than simply assuming 
that a test’s popularity equals its merit: this Note identifies two factors to serve 
as a yardstick against which one can measure the four undue hardship tests.172 
                                                                                                                           
 166 Id. (discharging the majority of Ms. Gharavi’s student loans). 
 167 Id. (“The Debtor only has enough surplus income to afford payments on [Educational Credit 
Management Corporation (ECMC)] loan number one. I will therefore discharge all of the U.S. De-
partment of Education’s loans and all of ECMC’s loans except loan number one.”). The appropriate-
ness of partially discharging student loans is a source of disagreement between bankruptcy courts. See 
Great Lakes Higher Educ. Corp. v. Brown (In re Brown), 239 B.R. 204, 212 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1999) 
(holding that bankruptcy courts have authority to partially discharge student loans). But see Andresen 
v. Neb. Student Loan Program (In re Andresen), 232 B.R. 127, 136 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 1999) (recogniz-
ing the possibility that bankruptcy courts lack authority to re-write student loans or grant partial dis-
charges). The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts in 2006 in Gharavi v. U.S. 
Department of Education (In re Gharavi) avoided the partial discharge issue, holding that discharge of 
some individual student loans but not others was not a partial discharge and thus, there was no ques-
tion of the bankruptcy court’s authority to do so. 335 B.R. at 501; see Coutts v. Mass. Higher Educ. 
Corp. (In re Coutts), 263 B.R. 394, 401 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2001) (discharging some but not all of a 
debtor’s student loans and holding that this was not a partial discharge).  
 168 See supra note 156 and accompanying text (stating the three considerations that courts rely 
upon in their Totality test analysis). 
 169 Hicks v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Hicks), 331 B.R. 18, 24 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005) 
(emphasizing the fact-sensitive nature of the Totality test inquiry and the discretion it affords courts to 
reach a balance between the fresh start policy and abuse of the student loan system). 
 170 See 11 U.S.C. § 101 (defining terms of art in the Bankruptcy Code but omitting definition of 
the term undue hardship); supra note 35 and accompanying text (citing the Bankruptcy Code and 
numerous court decisions to show that Congress has not defined undue hardship). 
 171 See supra notes 108, 128, 131, 152 and accompanying text (describing the current status of the 
Johnson, Bryant, Brunner, and Totality tests). 
 172 See infra notes 175–181 and accompanying text. 
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Section A of this Part evaluates the undue hardship tests using a two-part 
framework, which is informed by the arguments that judges frequently use to 
endorse their preferred test.173 Sections B through E apply this framework to 
assess the merits of the Johnson, Bryant, Brunner, and Totality tests respec-
tively.174 
A. Measuring the Merits of Undue Hardship Tests:  
A Two-Factor Approach 
Although bankruptcy judges disagree about which undue hardship test is 
best, most anchor their discussion of the test in Congress’s policy goals for the 
student debt discharge exception.175 As previously stated in Part I of this Note, 
Congress aimed to protect the student loan system from opportunistic students 
abusing the system by discharging student debt at bankruptcy and then em-
barking on successful careers, free of repayment obligations.176 Evidently, 
Congress cared deeply about achieving this end, as the student debt discharge 
exception contravened bankruptcy’s axiomatic fresh start policy.177 Conse-
quently, when arguing for a particular undue hardship test, bankruptcy judges 
focus intently on whether the test successfully effectuates Congress’s policy 
aims.178 
That said, an effective undue hardship test must go further than merely 
incorporating Congress’s policy goals—it must also be practicable.179 Judges 
evidence their concern for creating a practicable test with criticism of some 
undue hardship tests for being difficult to apply, internally inconsistent, or un-
necessarily complicated.180 Thus, although judges have reached different con-
                                                                                                                           
 173 See infra notes 175–181 and accompanying text. 
 174 See infra notes 182–237 and accompanying text. 
 175 See Thomas v. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Thomas), 931 F.3d 449, 453 (5th Cir. 2019) (arguing in 
favor of the Brunner test by citing Congress’s intention to prevent student debtors from abusing the 
student loan discharge); Kopf v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Kopf), 245 B.R. 731, 738 (Bankr. D. Me. 
2000) (assessing the validity of the Johnson test by comparing it to Congress’s policy against students 
abusing the bankruptcy system). 
 176 See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text. 
 177 See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text. 
 178 See Hemar Ins. Corp. of Am. v. Cox (In re Cox), 338 F.3d 1238, 1242 (11th Cir. 2003) (rea-
soning that a valid undue hardship test should reflect Congress’s aim of making student debt discharg-
es more difficult); In re Roberson, 999 F.2d 1132, 1136 (7th Cir. 1993) (adopting the Brunner test 
because it comports with congressional intent); Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In 
re Brunner), 46 B.R. 752, 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (reasoning that Congress chose to override the fresh 
start policy in favor of the student debt discharge exception), aff’d, 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987). The 
explicit inclusion of a “policy” prong in the Johnson test underscores the impact of congressional 
policy on the undue hardship tests. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 
No. 77-2033, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11428, at *52 (E.D. Pa. June 27, 1979). 
 179 See infra notes 180–181 and accompanying text. 
 180 See Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Faish (In re Faish), 72 F.3d 298, 303 (3d Cir. 
1995) (arguing that courts should not apply the Johnson test because it is needlessly complicated); 
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clusions about which test to use, the common thread is an emphasis on these 
two considerations: (1) that a valid undue hardship test must reflect Congress’s 
policy goals, and (2) that judges must be able to apply the test effectively in 
practice.181 
B. The Johnson Test: Strong on Policy, Weak on Organization 
The Johnson test most clearly reflects Congress’s policy goals underlying 
the student loan discharge exception because it is the only test that devotes one 
prong entirely to what Congress sought to achieve.182 The U.S. District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania’s 1979 Pennsylvania Higher Educa-
tion Assistance Agency v. Johnson (In re Johnson) opinion highlights the 
court’s commitment to furthering congressional policy by relying on lengthy 
quotations from the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of the United States in 
the opinion and case law to operationalize Congress’s policy.183 Although this 
test reflects a commitment to Congress’s goals, it is difficult to apply in prac-
tice.184 
Arguably, the Johnson test is needlessly complicated and bizarrely orga-
nized.185 The Johnson test’s mechanical checklist requires bankruptcy judges 
to consider eleven factors assessing the debtor’s financial wellbeing but does 
                                                                                                                           
Hicks v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Hicks), 331 B.R. 18, 30 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005) (alleging 
that the Brunner test creates only the illusion of uniformity and consistency but lacks both in prac-
tice); Crowley v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Crowley), 259 B.R. 361, 368 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2001) 
(stating that the good faith requirement of the Brunner test is inconsistent with the other prongs). 
 181 See supra notes 175–180 and accompanying text (framing this Note’s analysis of the undue 
hardship tests by citing to factors that have influenced judges’ reasoning in precedent cases). 
 182 See infra notes 183–191 and accompanying text. Compare In re Johnson, 1979 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 11428, at *52 (relying on § 439A of the amended Higher Education Act of 1965 as support for 
its policy test), with Kopf v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Kopf), 245 B.R. 731, 740 (Bankr. D. Me. 
2000) (adopting the Totality test, which focuses on a fact-specific inquiry into the debtor’s ability to 
repay the loans rather than Congress’s policy). More specifically, the U.S. District Court for the East-
ern District of Pennsylvania in 1979 in Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency v. Johnson 
(In re Johnson) identified Congress’s policy towards student debt discharge in bankruptcy as “com-
bat[ing] the abuse of the bankruptcy laws by recently graduated students.” 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
11428, at *52. 
 183 In re Johnson, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11428, at *52–54 (citing language from the Bankruptcy 
Commission and reviewing case law that embodies the Commission’s policy aims to create the policy 
prong of the undue hardship test). The opinion in In re Johnson noted that, based on a review of the 
pertinent case law, the three factors most relevant to Congress’s policy were the student’s benefit from 
education, amount of student debt, and percentage of indebtedness. Id. at *54. Thus, the court used 
these factors to translate Congress’s broad policy aim against abuses into a prong of the undue hard-
ship test. Id. 
 184 See infra notes 186–191 and accompanying text (analyzing the difficulties that applying the 
Johnson test creates). 
 185 See infra notes 186–191 and accompanying text. 
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not indicate the relative weight of each factor.186 Additionally, the debtor may 
demonstrate an undue hardship by meeting either the policy prong or the good 
faith prong of the test.187 This functional equivalence begs the question of why 
both prongs are necessary.188 Lastly, the good faith inquiry focuses on the 
debtor’s past behavior to determine if the debtor sought to abuse the bankrupt-
cy system, but the policy prong focuses on the debtor’s future ability to repay 
their debts.189 The test’s inquiry into the debtor’s past and future behavior is 
confusing because of its temporal inconsistency.190 Therefore, it is unsurprising 
that the Johnson test influenced subsequent courts but those courts did not 
adopt the test wholesale because its ideas, despite their soundness, lacked prac-
tical coherence.191 
                                                                                                                           
 186 See supra notes 95–98 and accompanying text (listing the factors that courts consider under 
the Johnson test). This mechanical checklist has been the source of much criticism from other courts 
because it makes the Johnson test more complicated. See Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. 
Faish (In re Faish), 72 F.3d 298, 305 (3d Cir. 1995) (describing the Johnson test as “needlessly ver-
bose and multifaceted”); Bryant v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Bryant), 72 B.R. 913, 
915 n.2 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (recognizing that the Johnson test is a valuable for cataloging relevant 
issues but is too complicated for courts to use in practice). 
 187 In re Johnson, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11428, at *52 (noting that the policy prong is reached if 
the debtor succeeds in meeting the mechanical checklist but cannot establish good faith efforts to 
repay their student loans). 
 188 See Kopf v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Kopf), 245 B.R. 731, 741 (Bankr. D. Me. 2000) (com-
menting that inclusion of the good faith and policy prongs is superfluous and repetitive); In re John-
son, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11428, at *52. 
 189 In re Johnson, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11428, at *50–51, *57–58 (focusing on a debtor’s past 
expenditures to measure good faith but focusing on future payment obligations for the policy prong); 
see In re Kopf, 245 B.R. at 741–42 (noting that the policy prong’s focus on the debtor’s past behavior 
is inappropriate and lacks textual authority). In 2000 in Kopf v. United States Department of Educa-
tion (In re Kopf), Judge James B. Haines, Jr. of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maine 
elaborated on this temporal element, postulating that the good faith prong was a vestige from when the 
Bankruptcy Code imposed a time limit on undue hardship: 
Analysis of the debtor’s pre-bankruptcy repayment efforts and repayment history, an 
aspect of the Johnson test shared with Brunner, has historical roots in the time when 
student loans were automatically rendered dischargeable in bankruptcy when they had 
been due and unpaid for five, later seven, years. Courts were then concerned that a 
debtor who chose bankruptcy before five or seven years expired and sought “undue 
hardship” discharge within that period might not yet have given repayment efforts a 
chance. That time is past. 
245 B.R. at 741. 
 190 See supra notes 186–189 and accompanying text. 
 191 See Andresen v. Neb. Student Loan Program (In re Andresen), 232 B.R. 127, 137–38 (B.A.P. 
8th Cir. 1999) (stating that the Johnson test heavily influenced the Brunner test); Bryant v. Pa. Higher 
Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Bryant), 72 B.R. 913, 915 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (recognizing that, 
like the Johnson test, the court would inquire into the debtor’s capacity to maintain a minimal stand-
ard of living during the loan repayment period). 
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C. The Bryant Test: The Inverse of the Johnson Test 
The second test, the Bryant test, is the inverse of the Johnson test because 
it fails to effectuate congressional policy, but is straightforward in applica-
tion.192 Unlike the Johnson court, which focused on Congress’s fear of debtors 
abusing the bankruptcy system, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania in 1987 in Bryant v. Pennsylvania Higher Education As-
sistance Agency (In re Bryant) cited language in the legislative history that ad-
dressed a debtor’s ability to maintain a “minimal standard of living.”193 This 
language strongly influenced the design of the Bryant test, which is evident in 
the test’s focus on the debtors’ situation relative to the federal poverty line.194 
Subsequent decisions, however, affirmed that Congress’s goal of preventing 
opportunistic student debtors from discharging debt is the key language in the 
legislative history, not the “minimal standard” language.195 
Additionally, the In re Bryant court attempted to avoid making moral 
judgments about whether the debtor’s expenses were reasonable, which also 
distinguishes its analysis from the Johnson test.196 In short, the Bryant test was 
not broadly accepted because the In re Bryant court omitted Congress’s abu-
sive debtor policy and refused to pass moral judgment on the debtor’s financ-
es.197 Moreover, by refusing to pass moral judgment on the debtor, the Bryant 
court ignored Congress’s primary goal for the student debt discharge excep-
                                                                                                                           
 192 See infra notes 193–202 and accompanying text. 
 193 Compare In re Bryant, 72 B.R. at 915–16 (relying on the Report of the Commission of the 
Bankruptcy Laws of the United States to include “minimal standard of living” as a focal point in its 
undue hardship test), with In re Johnson, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11428, at *52 (citing the same report 
but focusing on the policy against student debtors taking advantage of bankruptcy to discharge student 
debt). 
 194 In re Bryant, 72 B.R. at 915–16 (stating that the Bryant test uses the federal poverty line to 
measure whether a debtor can maintain a minimal standard of living). 
 195 Compare id. at 916 (creating an undue hardship test that focused primarily on the debtor’s 
ability to maintain minimal standard of living), with Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Faish (In 
re Faish), 72 F.3d 298, 302 (3d Cir. 1995) (stating that the student loan discharge exception aimed to 
prevent abuse by undeserving student debtors), and Coutts v. Mass. Higher Educ. Corp. (In re Coutts), 
263 B.R. 394, 399 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2001) (stating that Congress’s policy clearly sought to crack 
down on abuses of the student loan system). 
 196 Compare In re Bryant, 72 B.R. at 918 (“[W]e feel strongly that our making moral judgments 
as to the appropriateness of expenditures by debtors should be kept to a minimum.”), with In re John-
son, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11428, at *31 (considering which expenses would be reasonable for a 
hypothetical debtor under similar circumstances as the debtor). This also distinguishes the Bryant test 
from the Totality test for undue hardship, which focuses on the reasonableness of the debtor’s expens-
es. See Kopf v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Kopf), 245 B.R. 731, 746 (Bankr. D. Me. 2000) (assessing 
the debtor’s living expenses for reasonableness in applying the Totality test); In re Bryant, 72 B.R. at 
918. 
 197 See supra notes 193–196 and accompanying text (stating that the Bryant test’s objectivity was 
partially responsible for its lack of acceptance because the Bryant court refused to pass moral judg-
ment on the debtor’s financial decisions). 
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tion, namely to protect the student loan system against abusive student debt-
ors.198 
Although the In re Bryant test failed from a policy standpoint, it success-
fully created an intellectually satisfying test both in its clarity and practicabil-
ity.199 Its concentration on the federal poverty line is brilliant because it is 
clear, objective, updated annually, and accounts for a debtor’s familial situa-
tion.200 Additionally, by defining “minimal standards of living” as near or be-
low the poverty line, the court retained flexibility to exercise discretion in bor-
derline cases.201 Ultimately, however, the test’s simplicity and ease of applica-
tion did not save it from widespread rejection by bankruptcy courts.202 
D. The Brunner Test: Effective, but Too Much So 
Although the third test, the Brunner test, represents a notable improve-
ment to the Johnson and Bryant tests, its unreasonable strictness may create 
inequitable results.203 From a policy perspective, the Brunner test succeeds 
because it prevents debtors from discharging their student loans before starting 
lucrative careers, which is what Congress intended.204 The second prong of the 
Brunner test is the most stringent mechanism for enforcing this policy.205 Un-
der this prong, a debtor must demonstrate circumstances that prevent the debt-
or from maintaining a minimal standard of living during a substantial part of 
                                                                                                                           
 198 In re Bryant, 72 B.R. at 918; see In re Faish, 72 F.3d at 304 (“The Bryant test’s refusal . . . to 
question whether certain expenses debtors have incurred can be justified seems inconsistent with 
Congress’s dual legislative goals . . . .”). 
 199 See infra notes 200–201 and accompanying text (praising the Bryant test because it used the 
federal poverty line as a bright-line rule and gave bankruptcy judges flexibility in assessing undue 
hardship). 
 200 In re Bryant, 72 B.R. at 916 (arguing that the federal poverty line is an effective measure of 
poverty because it is updated every year and is used by numerous federal assistance programs). 
 201 See id. at 919. 
 202 See In re Faish, 72 F.3d at 304 (expressly rejecting the Bryant test and the reasoning that sup-
ports it); Claxton v. Student Loan Mktg. Ass’n (In re Claxton), 140 B.R. 565, 569 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 
1992) (deciding not to follow the Bryant test because it is too debtor-friendly). 
 203 See infra notes 204–217 and accompanying text (describing the inequitable shortcomings of 
the Brunner test). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in 1995 in Pennsylvania Higher 
Education Assistance Agency v. Faish (In re Faish) emphasized that the Brunner test is an improve-
ment on the Johnson and Bryant tests, arguing that Brunner is clearer than the Johnson mechanical 
checklist and is more critical than the Bryant test with regards to student debtor’s expenditures. See 72 
F.3d at 306. 
 204 See In re Faish, 72 F.3d at 305 (adopting the Brunner test because it comports with Con-
gress’s goal of preventing debtors from abusing the student loan system); In re Pelkowski, 990 F.2d 
737, 744 (3d Cir. 1993) (same). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in In re Pelkowski, 
supported its position on legislative intent by citing to Representative Allen E. Ertel, who argued that 
the increasing rate of bankruptcies resulting from student debt necessitates a change of law to prevent 
“discriminating against future students, because there will be no funds available for them to get an 
education.” 990 F.2d at 742–43 (quoting 124 CONG. REC. 1791–92 (1978)). 
 205 See infra notes 206–208 and accompanying text. 
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the repayment period.206 This requirement allows bankruptcy judges to deny 
student debt discharges where debtors have favorable employment opportuni-
ties, robust health, small families, or strong educational backgrounds.207 This 
effectively precludes student debtors from discharging loans out of conven-
ience rather than necessity.208 
The good faith prong of the test further reinforces Congress’s aforemen-
tioned policy.209 This inquiry focuses on whether the debtor is maximizing 
available financial resources to pay off the student loan debt.210 To assess this, 
courts examine how long the debtor attempted to pay back loans before peti-
tioning for bankruptcy and whether the debtor used disposable income on gra-
tuitous purchases rather than loan repayment.211 Thus, the good faith prong 
targets the student debtors that Congress sought to penalize, namely those who 
prioritize their own personal expenditures over repaying their loans and then 
file for bankruptcy relief without making a concerted attempt at repayment.212 
The problem with the Brunner test is not in its application of Congres-
sional policy; rather, the test is flawed because it focuses so intently on stop-
ping student debtors from abusing the bankruptcy system that honest debtors 
get caught in the dragnet.213 The stringency of the Brunner test’s second prong 
bars debtors that Congress did not intend to prevent from discharging student 
debt from a financial fresh start.214 When courts deny discharge under the 
                                                                                                                           
 206 See U.S. Dep’t of Educ. v. Gerhardt (In re Gerhardt), 348 F.3d 89, 92 (5th Cir. 2003) (restat-
ing the second prong of the Brunner test); In re Faish, 72 F.3d at 305 (elaborating that this prong of 
the Brunner test requires long-lasting and dire financial circumstances). 
 207 See In re Gerhardt, 348 F.3d at 92 (denying student loan discharge because the debtor was 
well educated and did not seek job opportunities outside of his preferred field); Brunner v. N.Y. State 
Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In re Brunner), 46 B.R. 752, 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (denying discharge 
because the debtor was healthy, did not have any dependents, and did not make sufficient efforts to 
find employment), aff’d, 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 208 In re Pelkowski, 990 F.2d at 742 (recognizing Congress’s policy of preventing debtors from 
discharging debt “on the brink of lucrative careers,” and adopting the Brunner test). 
 209 See infra notes 210–211 and accompanying text. 
 210 In re Roberson, 999 F.2d 1132, 1134–35 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating that the good faith prong 
prevents debt discharge for debtors who failed to maximize financial resources). 
 211 In re Faish, 72 F.3d at 305 (recognizing that the good faith prong intends to to preclude finan-
cially negligent debtors from discharging student loans); Brunner, 831 F.2d at 397 (holding that debt-
or did not act in good faith because she filed for discharge only one month after her loans became 
due); Sands v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc. (In re Sands), 166 B.R. 299, 312 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 
1994) (noting that debtors who file for bankruptcy shortly after debts become due is evidence of bad 
faith); see also In re Gerhardt, 348 F.3d at 92 (commenting on the debtor’s decision to attend a music 
festival during the loan repayment period as relevant to the undue hardship discussion). 
 212 See supra note 204 and accompanying text (discussing Congress’s intent to disincentivize debt-
ors from abusing the system by discharging student debts out of convenience rather than necessity). 
 213 See infra notes 214–217 and accompanying text (emphasizing the demanding nature of the 
Brunner test and how it sometimes results in severe applications against student debtors). 
 214 In re Gerhardt, 348 F.3d at 92 (stating that the second prong of the Brunner test is demanding 
because it requires total incapacity for future repayment); Hicks v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re 
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Brunner test to debtors who cannot pay their student loans due to sickness or 
disability, the discrepancy between Congress’s goals and courts’ application 
becomes clear.215 Far from being selfish students on the eve of lucrative ca-
reers, these debtors were on the eve of physical and financial ruin.216 Thus, the 
Brunner test fails in practice because it does not discern between honest and 
dishonest debtors, especially in jurisdictions requiring a “certainty of hope-
lessness.”217 
Proponents of the Brunner test argue that a stringent standard is necessary 
to protect the integrity of the student loan system.218 If, however, Congress in-
tended to impose an undue hardship standard so insurmountable that virtually 
no student debtors can meet it, Congress might as well have dispensed with the 
undue hardship carve-out entirely.219 
E. The Totality Test: Greater Discretion Creates More Equitable Results 
The Totality test is arguably more flexible than the Brunner test because it 
relies on bankruptcy judges to exercise their discretion to achieve Congress’s 
policy goals, creating a more sensitive test with potentially more equitable re-
sults.220 The Totality test incorporates Congress’s policy of preventing abuse of 
the bankruptcy system by student debtors, but does so more subtly than the 
                                                                                                                           
Hicks), 331 B.R. 18, 28 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005) (arguing that the second prong of the Brunner test 
goes too far by requiring a “certainty of hopelessness”). 
 215 See Thomas v. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Thomas), 931 F.3d 449, 450, 452 (5th Cir. 2019) (holding 
that the debtor failed to satisfy the second prong of the Brunner test, despite leaving three jobs due to 
diabetic neuropathy); Tirch v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Tirch), 409 F.3d 677, 679, 
683 (6th Cir. 2005) (refusing discharge for debtor suffering from chronic depression, anxiety, and 
complications from colorectal surgery); Lozada v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Lozada), 604 B.R. 
427, 431, 437–38 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018) (denying discharge for a debtor with diabetes, rotator cuff 
tears, and herniated discs in his spine). 
 216 See In re Pelkowski, 990 F.2d 737, 742 (3d Cir. 1993) (adopting the Brunner test to prevent 
debtors from discharging loans before beginning successful careers). 
 217 Oyler v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Oyler), 397 F.3d 382, 386 (6th Cir. 2005) (requiring 
a certainty of hopelessness to demonstrate an undue hardship); In re Roberson, 999 F.2d 1132, 1136 
(7th Cir. 1993) (same). 
 218 See In re Thomas, 931 F.3d at 453 (stating that one goal of the student debt discharge excep-
tion was “rescuing the student loan system from fiscal doom” (quoting In re Pelkowski, 990 F.2d at 
743)). 
 219 See supra note 33 and accompanying text (citing statistics that demonstrate how few debtors 
succeed in discharging student loans because of undue hardship). In 2019, Congress did not take the 
opportunity to revise the undue hardship language in the Bankruptcy Code when it signed into law the 
Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019, which revised Chapter 11 of the Code. See Small Busi-
ness Reorganization Act of 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-54, 133 Stat. 1079. The undue hardship provision 
remains unchanged by this Act. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). 
 220 See infra notes 221–237 and accompanying text (comparing the Totality test against the Brun-
ner test, specifically focusing on the amount of discretion left to bankruptcy judges and effectuation of 
Congress’s policy aims). 
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Johnson or Brunner tests.221 It employs a fact-based inquiry into the debtor’s 
personal and financial situations to assess whether the student debtor is honest 
or abusive.222 This fact-based inquiry is the critical point that distinguishes the 
Totality test from the Brunner test.223 Whereas the Brunner test relies on its 
stringent prongs to effectuate Congressional policy, the Totality test trusts 
bankruptcy judges to exercise their discretion to achieve these same ends.224 
From a policy standpoint, the Totality test is similar to the Brunner test 
because both consider the fresh start principle that is central to bankruptcy, 
although arguably the Totality test does so more directly.225 When applying the 
Totality test, judges balance the fresh start principle against Congress’s policy 
that opportunistic student debtors should be treated more harshly than good 
faith debtors.226 This approach differs from the Brunner test, which solely fo-
cuses on preventing discharges for students who take advantage of the bank-
ruptcy system.227 The Totality test, therefore, encompasses a broader perspec-
tive of the policy aims underlying the undue hardship test than the Brunner test 
does.228 
                                                                                                                           
 221 Compare Hicks v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Hicks), 331 B.R. 18, 24 (Bankr. D. Mass. 
2005) (contending that the fact-sensitive inquiry of the Totality test reflects Congress’s goal of pre-
venting abuse of the bankruptcy system by student debtors), with In re Roberson, 999 F.2d at 1136 
(preventing abuse of the bankruptcy system by only discharging student loans for debtors with a “cer-
tainty of hopelessness”), and Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Johnson (In re Johnson), No. 77-
2033, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11428, at *52–53 (E.D. Pa. June 27, 1979) (creating a policy prong of 
the undue hardship test to prevent abusive student debtors from discharging their loan debt). 
 222 Long v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Long), 322 F.3d 549, 553–54 (8th Cir. 2003) (stating 
its preference for the Totality test because it vests bankruptcy judges with discretion to grant discharg-
es in accordance with congressional policy); In re Hicks, 331 B.R. at 24 (characterizing the Totality 
test as factually based and sensitive to context to enact Congress’s policy). 
 223 See infra note 224 and accompanying text (highlighting the fact-intensive focus of the Totality 
test as compared to the Brunner test). 
 224 Compare In re Long, 322 F.3d at 554 (“We are convinced that requiring our bankruptcy courts 
to adhere to the strict parameters of a particular test would diminish the inherent discretion contained 
in § 523(a)(8)(B).”), with Tirch v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Tirch), 409 F.3d 677, 
681 (6th Cir. 2005) (requiring a certainty of hopelessness for a debtor to discharge student loans under 
the Brunner test). 
 225 See infra notes 226–228 and accompanying text (stating that the Totality test addresses a wid-
er range of policy concerns than the Brunner test). 
 226 In re Hicks, 331 B.R. at 24 (stating that the Totality test strikes a balance between protecting 
the bankruptcy system and the fresh start policy); Crowley v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Crowley), 
259 B.R. 361, 365 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2001) (contending that the fact-based approach of the Totality 
test creates equitable results by balancing the fresh start and protection from abuse policies). 
 227 See supra notes 204–207 and accompanying text (stating Congress’s policy goal of preventing 
student debtors from discharging loans out of convenience, not necessity). 
 228 Compare In re Hicks, 331 B.R. at 24 (arguing in favor of the Totality test because it balances 
the fresh start principle and policy against debtor abuse), with In re Roberson, 999 F.2d 1132, 1136–
37 (7th Cir. 1993) (adopting a far more critical viewpoint towards student debtors and arguing for the 
Brunner test). In its impassioned defense of the Brunner test, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit in 1993 in In re Roberson argued that the Brunner test is appropriately demanding be-
cause student debtors assumed the risk of being unable to repay their loans. 999 F.2d at 1137. This 
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Additionally, the Totality test is arguably well-suited in practical applica-
tion because it is both straightforward and flexible.229 Unlike the tripartite ap-
proaches of the Johnson and Brunner tests, the Totality test focuses on answer-
ing one question: based on the debtor’s income, reasonable expenses, and other 
relevant factors, will the debtor be able to maintain a minimal standard of liv-
ing while repaying the student loans?230 When applying this test, courts calcu-
late a debtor’s loan repayment capacity by examining the debtor’s current and 
projected net income and whether these are likely to change.231 Judges have 
discretion to consider factors making loan repayment more likely, such as a 
student loan consolidation program, or less likely, such as a debtor’s debilitat-
ing illness.232 
Critics of the Totality test find it too permissive for student debtors and 
therefore believe the test risks undermining the integrity of the student loan 
system.233 Yet cases in which debtors were denied student debt discharges un-
der the Totality test despite sympathetic personal circumstances somewhat re-
but the critic’s fears.234 Additionally, others have argued that application of the 
                                                                                                                           
argument epitomizes how courts employing Brunner disregard the fresh start principle in their undue 
hardship analysis because it presumes the debtor does not deserve a new financial opportunity after 
bankruptcy. See id. 
 229 See infra notes 230–232 and accompanying text (comparing the Totality test, which focuses 
on one central question, with the other multifactorial tests). 
 230 Compare Gharavi v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Gharavi), 335 B.R. 492, 497 (Bankr. E.D. 
Mass. 2006) (stating that the Totality test examines “the Debtor’s past, present, and likely future in-
come and reasonably necessary living expenses, as well as other relevant circumstances, to determine 
whether the Debtor is capable of earning enough to sustain herself and her dependents while repaying 
her educational debt”), with Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Johnson (In re Johnson), No. 77-
2033, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11428, at *59–61 (E.D. Pa. June 27, 1979) (stating the three-prong un-
due hardship test, one prong of which includes eleven subordinate factual considerations). 
 231 See Coutts v. Mass. Higher Educ. Corp. (In re Coutts), 263 B.R. 394, 397 (Bankr. D. Mass. 
2001) (calculating the debtor’s net income based on her wages, rent, utilities bills, grocery costs, and 
car payments, and also accounting for the debtor’s spinal cord injury, in assessing her ability to work). 
 232 See Brondson v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Brondson), 435 B.R. 791, 804 (B.A.P. 1st 
Cir. 2010) (holding that courts may consider whether a debtor utilized the Income Contingent Repay-
ment Plan to consolidate her loans under the Totality test); Smith v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Smith), 
582 B.R. 556, 559–60 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2018) (evaluating the debtor’s financial situation in relation to 
his treatment for numerous psychiatric disorders). 
 233 See Thomas v. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Thomas), 931 F.3d 449, 455 (5th Cir. 2019) (characteriz-
ing the Totality test as a weaker standard than the Brunner test). 
 234 Brunell v. Citibank (S.D.) (In re Brunell), 356 B.R. 567, 580 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2006) (“I am 
not unsympathetic to the Debtor’s difficulty in raising three children while working full-time. But 
because her current income and expenses necessary to provide for herself and her children, with some 
small adjustments to her expenses, demonstrate that she holds a surplus from which a monthly pay-
ment toward her student loan obligations can be made, I do not find that she face[s] an undue hardship 
. . . .”); Paul v. Suffolk Univ. (In re Paul), 337 B.R. 730, 732, 739 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2006) (refusing to 
discharge student debt for mother of three who emigrated from Haiti and spoke English as a second 
language); Hicks v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Hicks), 331 B.R. 18, 32, 38 (Bankr. D. Mass. 
2005) (denying discharge to debtor despite her multiple sclerosis). 
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Totality test produces non-uniform results.235 In Hicks v. Educational Credit 
Management Corp.(In re Hicks), decided in 2005, Judge Henry J. Boroff of the 
U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts responded directly to 
this criticism, arguing that the Totality test is no less uniform in application 
than the Brunner test because Brunner only creates the illusion of consisten-
cy.236 Although it is the minority view today, the Totality test may be effective 
because it adopts a broader policy perspective, trusts in the discretion of the 
bankruptcy judges to enact this policy, and leads to more equitable results.237 
III. PERSPECTIVES ON THE FUTURE: CRISIS AND MODERATE REFORM 
The history of student debt in bankruptcy is a story of stagnation, not 
change.238 Congress introduced the term undue hardship when it amended the 
Higher Education Act of 1965, then imported it into the Bankruptcy Code in 
1978, and thereafter left it on the shelf, gathering proverbial dust.239 As a re-
sult, judges must do the lion’s share of the work, creating the undue hardship 
tests without the benefit of a compass bearing from Congress.240 
                                                                                                                           
 235 In re Thomas, 931 F.3d at 455 (arguing that the totality standard creates inconsistent results); 
Grigas v. Sallie Mae Servicing Corp. (In re Grigas), 252 B.R. 866, 874 n.8 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2000) 
(advocating for the Brunner test over the Totality test for the sake of uniformity). The U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Thomas v. Department of Education (In re Thomas) in 2019 argued 
that the Totality test is a standard rather than a bright-line rule, which would result in courts reaching 
different conclusions on similar facts. 931 F.3d at 455. The court, however, failed to provide any ex-
amples of these inconsistent results. Id. 
 236 In re Hicks, 331 B.R. at 30–31 (noting that courts have modified the Brunner test and often 
apply similar facts to different prongs of the test). For example, Judge Boroff of the U.S. Bankruptcy 
Court for the District of Massachusetts argued that courts purport to apply the same Brunner test, but 
treat the same types of facts differently across jurisdictions. See id. at 30 (stating that “different courts 
and different circuits” apply the Brunner test in variable ways, creating confusion as to which specific 
test within the Brunner framework should be adopted). Specifically, Judge Boroff argued that facts 
related to the debtor’s net income maximization can fall under any of the three Brunner prongs. Id. at 
30–31 nn.15–17 (collecting cases that illustrate the non-uniform application of the Brunner test); see 
also Oyler v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Oyler), 397 F.3d 382, 386 (6th Cir. 2005) (stating that a 
debtor’s attempts to increase income belong under the second prong of the Brunner test); Educ. Credit 
Mgmt. Corp. v. Polleys, 356 F.3d 1302, 1312 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing the debtor’s attempts to maxim-
ize income as evidence of good faith under Brunner’s third prong); Rifino v. United States (In re 
Rifino), 245 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 2001) (listing the debtor’s opportunity to reduce her budget 
under the first Brunner prong). 
 237 See supra notes 221–236 and accompanying text (emphasizing that the Totality test’s fact-
based focus and flexibility will create fairer outcomes for student debtors in undue hardship cases). 
 238 See infra notes 239–240 and accompanying text. 
 239 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (requiring an undue hardship to discharge student loans at bankruptcy); 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. 
§§ 101–1532) (preventing student debt discharge within five years unless the debtor can demonstrate 
an undue hardship); Education Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-482, § 439A, 90 Stat. 2081, 
2141 (repealed 1978) (amending the Higher Education Act of 1965, coining the term undue hardship, 
and laying the groundwork for subsequent inclusion of the term in the Bankruptcy Code). 
 240 See Andresen v. Neb. Student Loan Program (In re Andresen), 232 B.R. 127, 139 (B.A.P. 8th 
Cir. 1999) (reaffirming the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals’ totality of the circumstances approach to 
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Section A of this Part offers competing perspectives on the student debt 
discharge exception and concludes that either viewpoint can support a strict or 
permissive approach to the treatment of student debt in bankruptcy.241 Section 
B proposes reforms to the treatment of student debt in bankruptcy in response 
to the modern student debt crisis.242 Ultimately, this Part argues that Congress 
must define the term “undue hardship” by codifying the Totality test, which 
would remove the burden from judges and ensure consistency across courts in 
the United States.243 
A. Government and Student Debt: An Identity Crisis 
When contemplating how to change the undue hardship jurisprudence to 
mitigate the student debt crisis, it is helpful to consider what role the U.S. gov-
ernment should play in student lending.244 From the creditor perspective, 
courts should treat the government like any other creditor at bankruptcy be-
cause it is simply entering into voluntary lending agreements with students.245 
From the investor perspective, courts should treat the government differently 
because its role as an investor in the American education transcends the tradi-
tional lender-borrower relationship.246 
Under the above-mentioned creditor perspective, a strong argument exists 
in favor of adopting a stringent undue hardship test in bankruptcy.247 American 
bankruptcy law, influenced by English bankruptcy and insolvency law, is his-
torically rooted in the idea that creditors must have recourse against debtors 
who are unwilling or unable to pay.248 Today, many Bankruptcy Code provi-
                                                                                                                           
undue hardship); Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In re Brunner), 46 B.R. 752, 756 
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (creating the influential Brunner three-part undue hardship test), aff’d, 831 F.2d 395 
(2d Cir. 1987); Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Johnson (In re Johnson), No. 77-2033, 1979 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11428, at *59–61 (E.D. Pa. June 27, 1979) (stating the tripartite Johnson test for 
undue hardship). 
 241 See infra notes 244–264 and accompanying text. 
 242 See infra notes 265–288 and accompanying text. 
 243 See infra notes 244–288 and accompanying text. 
 244 See infra notes 245–264 and accompanying text (contending that viewing the federal govern-
ment as a creditor or an investor in students’ futures affects policy considerations around the undue 
hardship test). 
 245 See In re Roberson, 999 F.2d 1132, 1136–37 (7th Cir. 1993) (emphasizing that the relationship 
between the student and government is that of creditor-debtor, not insurer-policyholder); In re Brun-
ner, 46 B.R. at 755 n.3 (stating that the government is not the “insurer of educational value”). 
 246 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (“Today, education is perhaps the most 
important function of state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great 
expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our 
democratic society.”). 
 247 See infra notes 248–252 and accompanying text. 
 248 Marcia S. Krieger, “The Bankruptcy Court Is a Court of Equity”: What Does That Mean?, 50 
S.C. L. REV. 275, 282–286 (1999) (describing the influence of English bankruptcy and insolvency law 
on early American bankruptcy jurisprudence). Colonial bankruptcy law afforded creditors significant 
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sions protect creditors from the unscrupulous actions of debtors, such as re-
strictions on fraudulent transfers and avoidable preferences.249 Thus, if the 
government is to be treated like any other creditor, adopting the strictest undue 
hardship test is merely a continuance of the Bankruptcy Code’s historical pro-
creditor orientation.250 For example, a demanding undue hardship test protects 
the student loan system from depletion in a similar way to fraudulent transfer 
provisions protecting the property of the estate from being depleted by sham 
transactions.251 Adherents of this view would also argue that student borrowing 
is a voluntary transaction and therefore, students should bear the risk of non-
repayment, not the government.252 
There is, however, a strong counterargument to these points: if the gov-
ernment is just like any other creditor, then there should be no discharge ex-
ception for student loans in the first place.253 If the government is in fact just 
another creditor, then it does not deserve the special treatment of a student debt 
discharge exception.254 Further, if the government receives the benefit of this 
                                                                                                                           
latitude in collecting from debtors, even imprisonment for nonpayment in some cases. Id. at 286. This 
historical favoritism towards creditors dates to the drafting of the United States Constitution, when 
most authorities understood that bankruptcy was a tool for creditor protection rather than debtor relief. 
See James Monroe Olmstead, Bankruptcy a Commercial Regulation, 15 HARV. L. REV. 829, 830–31 
(1901) (reviewing the early history of American bankruptcy law). 
 249 See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (empowering the bankruptcy trustee to recapture assets transferred 
from the bankruptcy estate that shows a preference for one creditor over the others); id. § 548(a)(1) 
(stating that the bankruptcy trustee has the power to avoid a debtor’s fraudulent transfers). 
 250 See In re Brunner, 46 B.R. at 756 (providing the most challenging undue hardship test for 
debtors, which has become the majority rule among bankruptcy courts). A rebuttal to this argument is 
that, although the earliest history of bankruptcy favors creditors, the codification of the general dis-
charge for individual debtors represents a shift to a pro-debtor standpoint within Chapter 7 of the 
Bankruptcy Code. Compare Krieger, supra note 248, at 282–86 (emphasizing the pro-creditor nature 
of early Anglo-American bankruptcy law), with 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (providing honest debtors subject 
to Chapter 7 bankruptcy a general discharge of their debts, which favors debtors over their unsecured 
creditors). 
 251 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (requiring a debtor to demonstrate an undue hardship to discharge 
student debt, enacted in response to Congress’s fear of debtors using the bankruptcy system); id. 
§ 548(a)(1) (restricting debtors from engaging in fraudulent transfers that conceal assets from disposi-
tion to creditors); REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, 
H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. 1, at 94–95 (1973) (recognizing debtor abuses of the discharge system as 
an important concern). 
 252 See In re Roberson, 999 F.2d 1132, 1137 (7th Cir. 1993) (“The government is not twisting the 
arms of potential students. The decision of whether or not to borrow for a college education lies with 
the individual . . . .”). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in 1993 in In re Roberson 
argued that because student borrowing is entirely voluntary, the risk should lie with the student, not 
the taxpayer. Id. 
 253 See infra notes 254–255 and accompanying text. 
 254 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (stating that student debt is non-dischargeable unless the debtor can 
demonstrate an undue hardship). 
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exception, congress should implement a permissive undue hardship test as a 
counterbalance.255 
Alternatively, viewing the government as an investor in American educa-
tion leads to different conclusions about how student debt should be treated in 
bankruptcy.256 American education is inextricably tied to the American 
dream.257 Presidential speeches and Supreme Court decisions have reinforced 
the idea that government must play a key role in helping students access edu-
cation.258 
Under this view, the government’s duty to promote American education 
necessitates a more permissive bankruptcy regime under which more students 
who failed to complete their education can discharge their loans.259 Thus, debt-
ors like Vera Francis Thomas, of the 2019 U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit’s case Thomas v. Department of Education (In re Thomas), who sought 
the American dream through higher education would not be left in penury be-
cause illness, disability, or personal tragedy rendered loan repayment impossi-
ble.260 
Conversely, this “investor” view of the government can also support an 
argument in favor of a more stringent undue hardship test: if the government is 
                                                                                                                           
 255 See id.; Hicks v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Hicks), 331 B.R. 18, 24 (Bankr. D. Mass. 
2005) (arguing in favor of the Totality test for undue hardship because it allows balance between the 
student debt discharge exception and fresh start policy, thus creating fairer results). See generally 11 
U.S.C. § 727(a) (describing the general discharge of debts at bankruptcy, absent fraud); id. § 523 
(listing the limited exceptions to the general discharge). 
 256 See infra notes 257–260 and accompanying text. 
 257 See Obama, supra note 19 (describing the experience of then-presidential candidate Obama’s 
mother to emphasize the connection between the American dream and access to higher education). 
The most impactful moment of the speech occurred when then-presidential candidate Obama recount-
ed his mother’s experience as an American, saying that as 
[a] single mom—even while relying on food stamps as she finished her education, she 
followed her passion for helping others, and raised my sister and me to believe that in 
America there are no barriers to success—no matter what color you are, no matter 
where you’re from, no matter how much money you have. 
Id. 
 258 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 843 (2007) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (characterizing the role of education as “help[ing] create citizens better pre-
pared to know, to understand, and to work with people of all races and backgrounds, thereby further-
ing the kind of democratic government our Constitution foresees”); United States v. Virginia, 518 
U.S. 515, 557–58 (1996) (striking down the Virginia Military Institute’s male-only admissions pro-
gram as unconstitutional, thereby allowing women the same right to attend as males); supra note 257 
and accompanying text (describing the connection between education and the American dream). 
 259 Compare Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (describing promotion of educa-
tion as a paramount function of government), with In re Roberson, 999 F.2d 1132, 1136–37 (7th Cir. 
1993) (arguing that the government is not an insurer of student education). 
 260 See Thomas v. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Thomas), 931 F.3d 449, 450, 453 (5th Cir. 2019) (deny-
ing the debtor a student loan discharge even though the debtor’s physical illnesses prevented her from 
maintaining three consecutive jobs). 
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the dream maker for the American student, then the government requires max-
imum protection from the abuses of opportunistic debtors.261 Thus, a harsh un-
due hardship test actually provides greater protection for students because abu-
sive student debtors cannot divert valuable financial resources from the system 
as a whole.262 
In conclusion, neither the perspective of the government as a creditor nor 
as an investor points unequivocally towards affirmation of the current student 
debt regime or complete systemic overhaul.263 Considering all of the foregoing 
perspectives, effective reform should balance the need for student debtor pro-
tections against the risk of rendering student debt discharge so easy that it 
threatens the integrity of the system as a whole.264 
B. Responding to a Crisis: The Need for Congressional  
Bankruptcy Reform 
Reform that balances debtor protection against systemic protection re-
quires recalibration, not revolution.265 The task of striking this balance rests with 
Congress, the political body best positioned to create effective, uniform 
change.266 Recent events have increased public scrutiny of the American educa-
tion system, thereby providing an impetus to create change in the near future.267 
Current events and the public responses to them have put the American 
education system squarely in the crosshairs of the public consciousness.268 The 
student debt crisis and college admissions scandals of 2018 and 2019 respec-
tively shed light on widespread systemic inequalities from elementary school 
to universities.269 The staggering amount of student debt permeates the public 
                                                                                                                           
 261 See id. at 453 (describing one of the aims of the student debt discharge exception as prevent-
ing the student loan system from “fiscal doom”); In re Pelkowski, 990 F.2d 737, 743 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(same). 
 262 See In re Pelkowski, 990 F.2d at 743 (arguing that the undue hardship test promotes the sol-
vency of the loan system by preventing student debtors with promising financial opportunities from 
discharging debt). 
 263 See supra notes 244–262 and accompanying text (positing that neither the creditor nor inves-
tor view of government in student lending is dispositive on the issue of student debt discharge re-
form). 
 264 See supra notes 244–262 and accompanying text (same). 
 265 See infra notes 266–288 and accompanying text. 
 266 See infra notes 276–277 and accompanying text. 
 267 See infra notes 271–273 and accompanying text. 
 268 See infra notes 269–273 and accompanying text. 
 269 See College Admissions Scandal: Your Questions Answered, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/14/us/college-admissions-scandal-questions.html [https://perma.cc/
JH6P-WE3S] (summarizing charges brought by federal prosecutors against fifty defendants who were 
accused of using bribes and deceit to gain admission to American universities); Heather Long, Hidden 
Crisis: D.C.-Area Students Owe Nearly Half a Million in K-12 School Lunch Debt, WASH. POST (Dec. 
28, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2018/12/28/hidden-crisis-dc-area-students-owe-
nearly-half-million-k-school-lunch-debt/?arc404=true [https://perma.cc/7FHE-JMSN] (describing 
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discourse, and commentators have dubbed it the “student loan crisis.”270 The 
2020 presidential election served as a microphone for these issues, with Dem-
ocratic candidates debating educational reform on national television.271 The 
debate has persisted even after President Joseph R. Biden Jr. election, with the 
new administration considering cancellation of some federal student debt.272 
Together, these events show that education is a relevant issue for Americans, 
typically a precondition to reform.273 
Congress is in the best position to reform the student debt system by re-
vising the Bankruptcy Code.274 Congress adopted the term undue hardship in 
                                                                                                                           
how Washington, D.C. students owed approximately $500,000 to schools after failing to pay for 
school lunches, resulting in those students receiving substandard lunches). The public response to 
these crises demonstrates how much scrutiny the American education system currently faces. See Kara 
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Senator Amy Klobuchar argued for a more moderate plan, focusing on making one- and two-year 
degrees free, and developing other loan repayment programs rather than wholesale debt cancellation. 
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the 1978 amendments and continued to leave it undefined in the 2005 amend-
ments.275 Not only is Congress responsible for the current undue hardship ju-
risprudential landscape, it also sits in the best position to remedy its faults.276 
Congress should do now what it should have done half a century ago and de-
fine the term undue hardship in a way that aligns with, or codifies, the Totality 
test.277 Defining undue hardship would create uniformity among the federal 
circuits and ensure that a debtor who files for bankruptcy in the Fifth Circuit is 
treated the same as one who files in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit.278 
The Totality test is the most effective undue hardship test because it pre-
vents opportunistic student debtors from abusing the student loan system and 
balances this interest against the fresh start principle.279 Moreover, the Totality 
test gives bankruptcy judges greater flexibility than the Brunner test to grant 
discharges to honest student debtors, thereby achieving more equitable re-
sults.280 Congress should define undue hardship in the Bankruptcy Code to 
codify the Totality test.281 This would settle the debate about which test is most 
effective and would rubber stamp case law from First and Eighth Circuit feder-
al judges who have championed the totality approach.282 In light of the severity 
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 282 See Long v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Long), 322 F.3d 549, 553 (8th Cir. 2003) (reject-
ing the Brunner test in favor of the Totality test for undue hardship); Kopf v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (In 
2021] Student Debt, Bankruptcy, and Undue Hardship 1663 
of the student debt crisis and the long-term, deleterious effects that burden-
some debt will have on a generation of Americans, the time has come to enact 
this reform.283 
If Congress fails to define undue hardship in the Bankruptcy Code, school 
officials must put students on notice about the potential financial consequences 
of their educational decisions.284 Guidance counselors and high school teachers 
should broaden their advice from how to get admitted to college to what hap-
pens if plans for higher education go awry.285 Students must be made aware 
that taking on student debt creates a risk of a financial burden that, under the 
current bankruptcy regime, is effectively non-dischargeable.286 Students ad-
vised of this risk could adjust their career plans accordingly by choosing ma-
jors associated with high-paying jobs, applying for grants to fund their educa-
tion instead of loans, or forgoing higher education altogether to enter the work-
force.287 Without congressional change, students will continue to fall victim to 
the Brunner test’s harsh undue hardship barrier to student loan discharge; put-
ting students on notice about the stark reality of the current system will at least 
give those students the opportunity to plan accordingly.288 
CONCLUSION 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy allows honest debtors to discharge their pre-petition 
debt and emerge from the bankruptcy proceeding with a financial fresh start. 
Congress abridged student debtors’ access to a fresh start when it adopted a 
student loan discharge exception under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). On the one 
hand, Congress limited student debtors’ ability to discharge their student loans 
out of concern that opportunistic student debtors would abuse the system and 
bring about its financial ruin. On the other hand, Congress provided some pro-
tection for the exceptional student debtors who could demonstrate an undue 
hardship. Congress, in leaving this term undefined in the Bankruptcy Code, 
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has left judges with the task of creating tests to operationalize undue hardship. 
Over time, judges created four prominent undue hardship tests: the Johnson, 
Bryant, Brunner, and Totality test. The Brunner test, the majority view today, 
imposes an extremely high bar for student debtors to demonstrate an undue 
hardship, effectively making most student loans in the United States non-
dischargeable. The Totality test, adopted by a minority of courts, gives judges 
additional discretion to grant discharges of student loans in extreme cases. In 
the context of the modern student debt crisis, in which student debt and tuition 
costs have reached unprecedented levels, the time has come for Congress to 
define the term undue hardship based on the case law developed in jurisdic-
tions that apply the Totality test. This moderate reform would result in greater 
uniformity among bankruptcy courts, and more equitable results for student 
debtors who seek bankruptcy as their last resort. Absent this reform, school 
officials should inform their students about this strict legal standard so that 
they can make prudent decisions about their financial futures. 
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